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EXCUSING HARMLESS ERRORS IN THE EXECUTION
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John H. Langbein*
An experiment of historic importance for the future of the Anglo-
American law of wills has been in progress over the last decade in
Australia. Two states of the federation, Queensland and South
Australia, have enacted prototype statutes that abrogate the traditional
rule of strict compliance with the requirements of Wills Act formality.
The new statutes enable the probate court to validate a will even when
the testator has failed to comply fully with the Wills Act.
The Queensland statute uses language for which I bear some re-
sponsibility; it authorizes "substantial compliance" with the Wills Act.
In the hands of the Queensland courts the measure has been a flop.
They have read "substantial" to mean "near perfect" and have contin-
ued to invalidate wills in whose execution the testator committed some
innocuous error.
In South Australia, by contrast, the legislation employs different
words, the so-called "dispensing power," directed to the same end.
This statute has produced a triumph of law reform. The South
Australian courts have welcomed their new power to excuse harmless
errors, and they have used it vigorously. An ample case law, which is
the main subject of this Article, provides a vantage point for assessing
the reform. The cruelty of the old law has disappeared. The concerns
that motivated the former strict compliance rule have been put to the
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test and have shown to be exaggerated or illusory. The reform has
been found to embrace the law of revocation as well as execution.
The South Australian legislation and case law have been closely
watched in law reform circles in Australia and beyond. The rest of the
Australian states seem poised to emulate the South Australian statute:
One state has enacted a duplicate measure, and offical law reform com-
missions in the other major states have advanced similar recommenda-
tions. The movement has spread to North America. In British
Columbia the law reform commission has recommended a version of
the South Australian Act, and Manitoba adopted another in 1983. A
trend already so extensive is not likely to leave the United States
untouched.
Part I of this Article supplies a background discussion of the tradi-
tional rule of strict compliance with the Wills Act, and of potential strat-
egies for devising a harmless error rule. In Part II, which is devoted to
the South Australian sources, I examine the origins and terms of the
statute and canvass the case law (including the published opinions and
an equally large body of unreported cases). Part III contrasts the disap-
pointing experience in Queensland. Part IV discusses the spread of the
South Australian model to other jurisdictions and mentions the experi-
ence under a comparable statute in Israel. Part V collects some
conclusions.
I. THE PROBLEM AND THE CURES
A. The Rule of Strict Compliance'
1. The Formalities. - Every Anglo-American jurisdiction has a so-
called Wills Act that prescribes the formalities for making a valid will.
These statutes trace back to English models, in the Wills Act of 18372
and earlier. Our received English tradition recognizes a single mode of
testation-the attested will, sometimes called the formal or witnessed
will. The essentials are writing, signature, and attestation. The terms
of the will must be in writing, the testator must sign it, and two wit-
nesses must attest the testator's signature. A variety of further require-
ments can be found in the Wills Acts of various jurisdictions: rules
governing the acknowledgment of a signature already in place, rules
calling for the testator and the witnesses to sign in each other's pres-
ence, requirements about the positioning of signature, and many
more.3
1. Much of the background material in this subsection derives from Langbein,
Crumbling of the Wills Act: Australians Point the Way, 65 A.B.A. J. 1192 (1979).
2. 7 Will. 4 & I Vict., ch. 26 (1837).
3. For an up-to-date compilation see Coughlin, Will Requirements of Various
States, ACPC Study No. 1, in ACPC Studies (American College of Probate Counsel,
1984) [hereinafter ACPC Study]. A well-known older compilation is Rees, American
Wills Statutes, 46 Va. L. Rev. 613, 856 (1960).
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An alternative formal system for so-called holographic (handwrit-
ten) wills is permitted to testators in half the American states, mostly
western jurisdictions where civilian legal regimes have been influential,
but also in Pennsylvania, Virginia, and now-through the medium of
the Uniform Probate Code-Michigan and New Jersey.4 Several
Canadian provinces recognize holographs, but England and the
Australian states do not. In effect, a holograph statute allows the testa-
tor to substitute handwriting for attestation, and thus entails a signifi-
cant reduction in the level of formality.5 The testator may execute his
will without witnesses, but it must be "materially" (or in some states
"entirely") in his handwriting.
2. The Purposes of the Formalities. - The testator will be dead when
the probate court enforces his will. The Wills Act is meant to assure
the implementation of his testamentary intent at a time when he can no
longer express himself by other means. The requirement of written
terms forces the testator to leave permanent evidence of the substance
of his wishes. Signature and attestation provide evidence of the genu-
ineness of the instrument, and they caution the testator about the seri-
ousness and finality of his act. The requirement that the will be
attested by disinterested witnesses is also supposed to protect the testa-
tor from crooks bent on deceiving or coercing him into making a dispo-
sition that does not represent his true intentions. The Wills Act thus
serves evidentiary, cautionary, and protective policies.6
3. Why Strict Compliance. - The puzzle about the Wills Act formal-
ities is not why we have them, but why we enforce them so stringently.
Consider Groffman,7 whose facts instance a common execution blunder.
Each of the two witnesses, who were attending a social gathering at the
testator's home, took his turn signing the will in the dining room while
the other witness was in the living room. The will was held invalid for
violation of the requirement that the testator sign or acknowledge it in
the presence of two witnesses present at the same time, although the
4. The American holograph states, as identified in ACPC Study, supra note 3, are
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West
Virginia, and Wyoming.
5. For discussion of the tension between the two levels of formality, see infra note
235.
6. I have also directed attention to a "channeling" policy: standardizing the forms
of execution helps routinize probate and lower costs. Langbein, Substantial Compliance
with the Wills Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 489, 493-94 (1975) [hereinafter Langbein, Substan-
tial Compliance].
7. [1969] 1 W.L.R. 733, [1969] 2 All E.R. 108 (Q.B.). Throughout this Article I
have departed from the bluebook convention for rendering the titles of case names.
Bluebook style retains procedural phrases such as "In re," "Estate of," and "Matter of,"
probably in order to signal that a case is a probate matter. Since virtually every case
cited in this Article is a probate matter, I have deleted these redundant phrases, and I
identify case titles by surname.
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judge forthrightly declared: "I am perfectly satisfied that that docu-
ment was intended by the deceased to be executed as his will and that
its contents represent his testamentary intentions."" The Wills Act is
meant to implement the decedent's intent; the paradox in a case like
Groffman is that the Wills Act defeats that intent. What makes Groffman
interesting is not the facts, which are commonplace, but the judge's
candor in admitting that his decision frustrated the decedent's intent.
Must it be so? Is the rule of strict compliance the inevitable price
for the benefits of Wills Act formality? If legal policymakers were put
to the choice between a regime of no Wills Act formalities, on the one
hand, versus the Wills Act as traditionally applied on the other hand,
there would be a large consensus in favor of the status quo. The great-
est blessing of the Wills Act formalities is the safe harbor that they cre-
ate. Without prescribed formalities, the testator would be left to grope
for his own means of persuading the probate court that his intentions
were final and volitional. The testator who complies with Wills Act for-
malities assures his estate of routine probate in all but exceptional cir-
cumstances. In order to escape the rule of strict compliance with the
Wills Act, therefore, the case must be made that the benefits of Wills
Act formality would be retained even if the law were changed to excuse
execution blunders.
4. Excusing Harmless Errors. ' When the testator has made a mis-
take in complying with the formalities, it does not follow that the pur-
poses of the Wills Act have been disserved. Consider again the
Groffman case, in which the testator signed out of the witnesses' joint
presence. The purposes of requiring the witnesses to be present to-
gether are (1) to transform execution into a ceremony, in order that the
testator be cautioned properly about the seriousness and finality of
signing the will, and (2) to make it harder for crooks to coerce or
deceive the testator into signing something he did not want. On the
actual facts in Groffman, there was abundant evidence that the will was
deliberate and volitional, hence that it embodied the decedent's testa-
mentary intent. The testator's conduct showed that the purposes of the
presence rule were served even though the testator neglected to com-
ply with the formality.9
The central insight that underlies the argument for a harmless er-
ror rule is that the law could avoid so much of the hardship associated
with the rule of strict compliance if the presumption of invalidity now
applied to defectively executed wills were reduced from a conclusive to
a rebuttable one. The proponents of a defectively executed will should
be allowed to prove what they are now entitled to presume in cases of
due execution-that the will expresses the decedent's testamentary in-
8. Id. at 735, [1969] 2 All E.R. at 109.
9. For discussion of the importance of the testator's conduct, especially attempted




tent. This argument has been resisted on the ground that a harmless
error rule would invite excessive and difficult litigation.10 If any scrap
of paper can be alleged to be a defectively executed will revoking the
prior will, then the reform could imperil the estates of careful testators
who complied fully with the Wills Act. There was always reason to
think that this concern was overstated. We shall see that the Australian
experience has now put it to rest.
B. Avenues for Reform
Broadly speaking, there are two ways to deal with the problem of
Wills Act execution blunders. Our initial instinct is to amend the Wills
Act to reduce the number and complexity of the formalities, so that the
testator will have less to get wrong. However, under the rule of strict
compliance, so long as some formalities remain, the least error in com-
plying with any of them still invalidates the will. The other solution is
to abridge the rule of strict compliance by fashioning a harmless error
rule to excuse blunders that do occur.
1. Refining the Formalities. - Much of the case for lowering the
levels of Wills Act formality rests on the success of what has come to be
called the nonprobate system, meaning life insurance, revocable trusts,
joint accounts, pension accounts, and other arrangements for transfer-
ring property outside the probate system upon the owner's death.1'
These will substitutes serve the function of a will through different pro-
cedures. The formalities for a nonprobate transfer originate in the con-
tract that creates the account, rather than in the Wills Act. Nonprobate
transfers typically require writing and signature but not attestation.
Thus, by comparison both with the nonprobate system and with ho-
lographic testation, attestation stands out as the distinguishing trait of
conventional Wills Act formality.
To the extent that the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) of 1969 may
be said to have addressed the problem of innocuous Wills Act blun-
ders, the drafters' solution was to reduce formality. "[E]xecution must
be kept simple," the official comment says. "To this end .... formali-
ties for a written and attested will are kept to a minimum ... ,,12 Sec-
tion 2-502 of the UPC, which prescribes the formalities for an attested
will, requires that the will be in writing, signed by the testator, and at-
tested by two witnesses who saw the testator sign or heard him ac-
knowledge his signature. "There is no requirement that the testator
publish the document as his will, or that he request the witnesses to
sign, or that the witnesses sign in the presence of the testator or of each
other . . . [or] that the testator's signature be at the end of the
10. See infra text accompanying note 249.
11. On the connection between the will substitutes and the movement for a harm-
less error rule, see Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 6, at 503-09.
12. U.P.C., art. 2, pt. 5 general comment.
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will . . "13 Further, a witness who benefits under the will does not
automatically forfeit his devise, as commonly occurs under traditional
Wills Acts.
14
Thus, a case like Groffman would not arise under the UPC, because
the presence requirement has been abolished. The drafters of the UPC
put themselves to the choice and decided that the benefits of the pres-
ence requirement were not worth the toll of frustrated estate plans in
cases like Grofftman. There are, however, intrinsic limits to reforming
the Wills Act in this way; sooner or later reform must confront irreduci-
ble levels of formality. Nobody favors abolishing the requirement that
the testator sign his will, yet many would agree that noncompliance
with the signature requirement should be excused under extraordinary
circumstances, as in the switched-wills cases discussed below' 5 where
husband and wife mistakenly sign each other's will. The same analysis
applies to the attestation requirement. Because attestation serves cau-
tionary and evidentiary policies, there is reason to retain the formal-
ity, 16 while excusing innocuous cases of defective compliance.
To eliminate hardship without altering the rule of strict compli-
ance would require abolishing the Wills Act formalities entirely. But a
legal system should be able to preserve relatively high levels of formal-
ity, in order to enhance the safe harbor that is created for the careful
testator who complies fully, without having to invalidate every will in
which the testator does not reach the harbor.
2. Strategies for Excusing Error. - There are two ways to fashion a
harmless error rule-either deem compliance or excuse noncompli-
ance. Under the substantial compliance doctrine, the court deems the
defective instrument to be in compliance. Under a statutory dispensing
power, the court validates the will even while acknowledging that the
will did not comply.
The substantial compliance doctrine is the only avenue open to the
courts without legislative intervention. The doctrine reconciles relief
with the commands of Wills Act formality by applying the Wills Act
purposively. In January 1975, before the Australian legislation had
been enacted, I published an article directed to American courts, urg-
ing them to develop a substantial compliance doctrine as a matter of
judicial interpretation of the Wills Act. 17 As I envisioned the doctrine,
the proponents of a defectively executed will would be required to
13. Id. § 2-502 comment.
14. Id. § 2-505 comment.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 101-12.
16. In a forthcoming Article, James Lindgren disputes this view, arguing, inter alia,
that the experience of the nonprobate system (in which attestation is uncommon) shows
that the probate system would function well if attestation were eliminated as a
mandatory formality. Lindgren, Abolishing the Attestation Requirement for Wills (un-
published manuscript on file at the Columbia Law Review). For further discussion of the
attestation requirement, see infra text accompanying notes 70, 95, and 253-54.
17. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 6.
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prove that the document expresses the decedent's testamentary intent,
and that "its form sufficiently approximate[s] Wills Act formality to en-
able the court to conclude that it serves the purposes of the Wills
Act."18 I pointed for analogy to similar judicially created doctrines:
the main purpose and the part performance rules under the function-
ally similar Statute of Frauds; and in the nonprobate system, the doc-
trine of substantial compliance with life insurance change-of-
beneficiary designation forms.19
After a decade of observing the Australian experiment under stat-
utes of either sort, I have come to prefer the dispensing power over
substantial compliance as a legislative corrective.20 I shall return to
that choice after having canvassed the case law that has arisen under the
prototype South Australian and Queensland statutes. I must empha-
size, however, that the substantial compliance doctrine remains the
only device suitable for excusing defects under an unabridged Wills
Act.
3. Nonstatutory Relief. - Neither in the United States nor else-
where in the common law world do the law reports teem with converts
to the cause of a judicially devised substantial compliance remedy.
Lawyers have been trained to regard the strict compliance rule as ines-
capable; few would think to seek judicial relief against a manifest blun-
der. Further, the substantial compliance doctrine is difficult to
introduce, because the strict compliance rule that it would supplant is
so entrenched.
In a recent New Jersey case the proponents of an arguably defec-
tive instrument asked the first-instance court to apply the substantial
compliance doctrine. 2' They relied upon the local probate treatise,
which had endorsed the doctrine and had predicted that New Jersey
would adhere to it. The court was able to find for the proponents on
another ground. While obviously sympathetic to the substantial com-
pliance doctrine, the judge said: "were I to rule that the will[] be ad-
mitted to probate because of substantial compliance with the Wills Act,
I would be breaking new ground, a role more appropriate to appellate
courts." 22 Because lower court decisions are not widely reported, we
18. Id. at 489; see id. at 515-26.
19. Id. at 498-99, 526-29.
20. When writing on this subject in 1975, supra note 6, I gave no consideration to a
dispensing power. At that time the ink was only a few years dry on the Uniform Probate
Code of 1969, which had neglected to reconsider the rule of strict compliance, and legis-
lative reform did not seem to be in the cards.
21. Fernandez, 173 NJ. Super. 240, 413 A.2d 998 (Super. Ct. 1980).
22. Id. at 245, 413 A.2d at 1001 (citing 5 NJ. Practice (Clapp, Wills and Adminis-
tration § 41, n.11) (3d ed. 1962 & Supp. 1979)).
The reasoning in the Fernandez case has lately been endorsed by an appellate court.
In Peters, 210 NJ. Super. 295, 509 A.2d 797 (Super. Ct. 1986), the intermediate court
approved the language quoted from Fernandez and added: "Even if we were inclined to
introduce substantial compliance into this area, ordinarily we should defer such a
1987]
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have no way of knowing how frequently similar thinking has affected
other cases at first instance.
As a practical matter, therefore, the proponent of a will that re-
quires the nonstatutory substantial compliance doctrine for its valida-
tion may have to litigate his case through two or three courts. Only in a
comparatively large estate would the potential return be worth the ex-
pense and risk of loss inherent in having to persuade the final-instance
court to abandon long-settled authority. 23 Yet the larger the estate the
more likely is the testator to have had competent professional help in
drafting and executing his will. Wills Act execution blunders arise
mostly in home-executed wills.
I know only one American precedent that has squarely24 validated
a concededly defective will on the ground that substantial compliance
satisfied the purposes of the Wills Act. In 1981 in Kajut,25 a
Pennsylvania first-instance court was presented with the will of a blind
testator who had signed by making his mark. Pennsylvania's Wills Act
has a particular requirement for a will signed by mark; the testator's
name must be "subscribed in his presence before or after he makes his
mark .. -26 The attorney who prepared the will in Kajut had had the
testator's name typed on the will in advance of the execution rather
than contemporaneously as the statute required. The court upheld the
will, reasoning that the purposes of the particular formality had been
achieved despite the formal breach. The holding expressly rested on
the doctrine of substantial compliance with the Wills Act. "The intent
of the testator was plain," the court said, and "no useful purpose can be
served by destroying the will he created by a technical adherence to the
Wills Act, the principal purpose of which is to make certain that the
intent of a testator is effectuated."
'27
II. Soutr AUSTRALIA's DISPENSING POWER
The snail's pace of progress under a nonstatutory substantial com-
change to the Supreme Court or Legislature." Id. at 307-08, 509 A.2d at 804. A dis-
senter resisted and urged the court to apply the substantial compliance doctrine. Id. at
309-12, 509 A.2d at 806-07.
23. Unless the substantial compliance claim arises as a supplementary or alternrative
ground, as in Fernandez.
24. It might also be fair to reckon the decision in Snide, 52 N.Y.2d 193, 418 N.E.2d
656, 437 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1981), discussed infra text accompanying notes 107-11, as a case
instancing a judicially developed harmless error or substantial compliance rule,
although the court did not speak in those terms.
25. 2 Pa. Fiduc. 2d 197, 22 Pa. D. & C.3d 123 (Orphans' Ct. 1981).
26. 20 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2502(2) (Purdon 1975).
27. Kajut, 2 Pa. Fiduc. 2d at 204, 22 Pa. D. & C.3d at 136; see also id. at 201-02, 22
Pa. D. & C.3d at 129-31. The case involved a conflict-of-laws point as well as the sub-
stantial compliance question. According to the lawyer who won the case at first instance,
the contest was settled before the decision could be subjected to appellate review. Let-
ter from NJ. Nakles to author (Nov. 6, 1986) (on file at Columbia Law Review).
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pliance doctrine in the United States contrasts markedly with the exten-
sive development that has occurred under South Australia's statutory
dispensing power. The statute has now been applied in forty-one
cases. 28 By canvassing this case law, I think that the observer can de-
rive a strong feel for how the harmless error principle works.
A. The Origins of Section 12(2)
1. Report and Statute. - In 1974 the Law Reform Committee of
South Australia took up the question of excusing Wills Act execution
blunders as an incidental topic in a report dealing mainly with a pro-
jected overhaul of the intestacy laws. 29 The committee observed that
the number of intestate estates could be reduced if the courts were em-
powered to validate wills that suffered "technical" execution defects.
"It would seem to us that in all cases where there is a technical failure
to comply with the Wills Act, there should be a power given to the
Court or Judge to declare that the will in question is a good and valid
testamentary document if he is satisfied that the document does in fact
represent the last will and testament of the testator .... ,,30
In November 1975 the state parliament translated the recommen-
dation into statute, as section 12(2) of the local Wills Act:
A document purporting to embody the testamentary inten-
tions of a deceased person shall, notwithstanding that it has
not been executed with the formalities required by this Act, be
deemed to be a will of the deceased person if the Supreme
Court [the court of first instance in probate matters], upon ap-
plication for admission of the document to probate as the last
will of the deceased, is satisfied that there can be no reason-
able doubt that the deceased intended the document to consti-
tute his will.31
There is little reason to think that either the law reform committee
or the legislature understood what a fundamental reform this measure
entailed. The committee's report devoted only two paragraphs to the
subject and invoked dramatically exceptional situations to illustrate the
need for the dispensing power. "A person dying of thirst in the desert
or a person in the icefields of Australian Antarctica may well scratch out
what is without doubt his last will and testament," yet be unable to pro-
cure attesting witnesses.
3 2
28. See infra notes 50-51.
29. Twenty-Eighth Report of the Law Reform Committee of South Australia to the
Attorney-General: Relating to the Reform of the Law on Intestacy and Wills (1974)
[hereinafter South Australia Report].
30. Id. at 10-11.
31. Wills Act Amendment Act (No. 2) of 1975, § 9 amending Wills Act of 1936,
§ 12(2), 8 S. Austl. Stat. 665.
32. South Australia Report, supra note 29, at 11. Australia has one of the most
urbanized populations in the world. The first commentator on § 12(2) remarked that
the law reform committee's emphasis on the isolated testator "embodies a somewhat
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No research report of the sort that Australian law reform commis-
sions customarily produce lies behind the recommendation. 3 In South
Australian legal circles, section 12(2) is thought to have been the inspi-
ration of the law reform committee's forceful chairman, Justice Howard
Zelling of the South Australian Supreme Court. Sitting judicially in
1983 in one of the main cases under section 12(2), Zelling,J. remarked
"with some diffidence [that] I wrote the report," but that "I had no idea
that what is now s[ection] 12(2), which came from one of the ideas I
incorporated in the report, would produce the amount of case law that
it has."3
4
A variety of other indicia reinforce the view that section 12(2) was
not a carefully considered product. The measure is not particularly in-
telligently placed in the Wills Act that it amends; it is tacked on to an
earlier section 12 that abrogates the old publication formality. Section
12(2) neglected to provide a transition rule to govern the estates of
persons who died after the effective date of the legislation but who left
wills afflicted with execution errors that had occurred before the act.3s
The section also did not address the intimate connection between er-
rors in execution and errors in revocation, which left the courts to ex-
tend the statute to revocation.36 Further, section 12(2) formulated the
romantic view of the modern Australian as a noble savage in constant battle with the
forces of nature." Palk, Informal Wills: From Soldiers to Citizens, 5 Adel. L. Rev. 382,
393 (1976).
The dying testator who "scratch[es] out what is without doubt his last will" can be
accommodated in a holograph jurisdiction; see, e.g., 26 Can. B. Rev. 1242 (1948), for
the case of a farmer, dying pinned beneath his tractor, who scratched his will on its
fender. The point is made below, infra text accompanying notes 90-91, that several of
the cases that require rescue under South Australia's harmless error doctrine would
stand as holographs in jurisdictions that, unlike the Australian states, recognize
holographs.
33. For discussion of the origins and work of the Australian law reform commis-
sions, see Castles, The New Principle of Law Reform in Australia, 4 Dalhousie L.J. 3
(1977). See infra text accompanying notes 217-30 for discussion of the extensively
researched law reform commission reports on the harmless error question from New
South Wales and Western Australia, and from the Canadian commissions in British Co-
lumbia and Manitoba.
Another lapse in the South Australia committee report, noticed by Palk, supra note
32, at 389, is that the report misstates the local requirement for the joint presence of
attesting witnesses. Section 8 of the Wills Act requires that the testator sign in the joint
presence of the witnesses, not (as the report has it) that the witnesses sign in the pres-
ence of each other. Wills Act of 1936, § 8, 8 S. Austl. Stat. 665. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 58-72 for discussion of the presence requirement under the harmless error
rule.
34. Kelly, 34 S.A. St. R. 370, 380 (1983). The question whether litigation levels
under § 12(2) are worrisome is discussed infra text accompanying notes 126-32,
174-89, 248-49.
35. The courts soon held that the section should apply retroactively. Kolodnicky,
27 S.A. St. R. 374, 378-83 (1981). This is surely the correct result, since retroactivity in
a purely remedial statute disturbs no reliance interests.
36. See discussion infra text accompanying note 133.
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proponents' burden of proof in an unfelicitous way, appropriating lan-
guage from the criminal law ("no reasonable doubt") that the courts
have had to bend. We shall see that the question of the correct stan-
dard of proof for the dispensing power is something of a sore point
under section 12(2).3
7
The full potential of so casual a piece of legislative drafting was not
at once perceived. The first decision, Graham,38 appeared three years
after the legislation was enacted. Subsequent case law under section
12(2) was a trickle until the 1980's. The shortcomings of section 12(2)
should not, however, be exaggerated. The basic grant of discretion for
excusing harmless errors was forthright enough to permit the courts to
work out its implications. Under a better drafted statute the legislation
might have controlled more. What actually happened under section
12(2) is that the courts were left to map out much of the dimensions of
the reform.
2. An Echo of Testator's Family Maintenance? - Although section
12(2) represents a great innovation, there is a sense in which the mea-
sure is not without antecedents in Australian probate law. Discretion is
the coin of section 12(2): The court is given discretion to vary the ordi-
nary course of probate law for the purpose of preventing injustice.
Since the beginning of this century, statutes in each Australian state
have conferred upon the court the discretion to vary the disposition of
a will in order to correct what the court determines to be inadequate
provision for a spouse or dependent.3 9 This system, still best known
under its early label of Testator's Family Maintenance (TFM), has been
extended to allow the court a similar discretion to vary the result that
would otherwise obtain under the intestacy statute. England adopted
TFM in 1938, and in the American literature TFM tends to be known as
the English system.40
TFM is the Commonwealth alternative to American forced share
law. TFM has, therefore, an objective that is quite distinct from section
12(2), and none of the section 12(2) cases has thus far led to TFM pro-
ceedings. TFM overrides rather than implements the testator's intent.
What TFM shares with section 12(2) is its method, judicial discretion. I
happen not to be an admirer of TFM. I prefer the fixed-fractions of
American forced share law and of Continental and American commu-
nity property law. 41 I do not think that adequate standards have been
or can be developed to govern judicial discretion when the question is,
37. See infra text accompanying notes 88-89, 157-73.
38. 20 S.A. St. R. 198 (1978).
39. The standard reference work is D. Wright, Testator's Family Maintenance in
Australia and New Zealand (3d ed. 1974).
40. The English statute is extracted and the American literature conveniently col-
lected in E. Clark, L. Lusky, & A. Murphy, Cases and Materials on Gratuitous Transfers
194-99 (3d ed. 1985).
41. See generally id. at 142-75 (treatment of American forced share law) and
175-81 (community property law).
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"How much is fair?" 4 2 By contrast, the question under section 12(2),
"Did the testator intend this document to be his will despite his formal
blunder?", is quite traditional and invites resolution by means of famil-
iar proofs. Nevertheless, the long experience with judicial discretion in
probate law under TFM may help explain why in Australia rather than
somewhere else the legal system found the confidence to experiment
with judicial discretion to excuse Wills Act execution blunders.
B. Probate Practice
1. Procedure. - The basic architecture of South Australian pro-
bate law derives from early nineteenth-century English ecclesiastical
practice. The division between common form and solemn form pro-
bate, which is still known as such in a few comers of American probate
practice,43 and which underlies the UPC's division between informal
and formal probate,4 is the organizing principle of South Australian
procedure. Common form probate is the norm, and it is nonconten-
tious; but when the validity of a will is in dispute probate must be in
solemn form.
In common form proceedings, the registrar of probates processes
routine estates. He refers questions of difficulty to a judge of the court
of general jurisdiction. When such a matter entails fact finding, the
court ordinarily does not hear witnesses but is informed by means of
witnesses' affidavits gathered by the solicitor for the estate in consulta-
tion with the registrar.45 Genuinely contested cases are heard in sol-
emn form; ordinary adversary procedure then pertains, with oral
examination and cross-examination of witnesses on contested issues of
42. For an illuminating discussion of why discretion under TFM miscarries while
discretion under the harmless error rule for Wills Act execution blunders succeeds, see
M. Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary Family Law and Succession
Law, 60 Tul. L. Rev. 1165 (1986).
Under TFM, discretion is routine and often unbounded. In 1980, I had occasion to
discuss TFM with the LateJustice F.C. Hutley of the New South Wales Supreme Court.
He remarked, only partly in jest, that as a result of TFM, "the only thing a testator can
be sure of achieving by will is his choice of an executor." TFM therefore impedes pre-
dictability and reliance, two of the dominant values of property law. By contrast with the
routine discretion of TFM, the harmless error rule for Wills Act execution blunders
operates only in highly exceptional circumstances, at the margin of a well-settled legal
rule. The harmless error rule is governed by a restrictive standard (well-proven testa-
tor's intent) that, experience has shown, actually promotes predictability. See infra text
accompanying note 247.
43. See generally 3 W. Bowe & D. Parker, Page on the Law of Wills § 26.11, at
26-29 (rev. ed. 1961).
44. See U.P.C. art. 3 general comment.
45. "The Registrar examines the application to ensure that the affidavits or papers
are not defective or incomplete. When he is satisfied that the application is in order, it is
then incumbent upon him to prepare a report for the assistance of the motions Judge."
A. Faunce de Laune, South Australia Registrar of Probates, "Re Informal Wills," letter
report to Dr. C.E. Croft, Executive Director, Law Reform Commission of Victoria (Dec.
14, 1984) (on file at the Columbia Law Review).
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fact. Most of the section 12(2) cases- thirty-six of forty-one-have
arisen in common form. The remaining five cases were nominally in
solemn form, although only three were seriously contested.
46
2. Court. - Section 12(2) bestows its excusing power upon the
Supreme Court, not the registrar of probates, although for tiny estates
the court has delegated its discretion to the registrar by means of a
published rule.4 7 The Supreme Court is the court of general jurisidic-
tion. No specialized probate division has formed within it. At first in-
stance, judges sit singly. The case law under section 12(2) is, therefore,
overwhelmingly the product of single-judge decisions rendered by a
nonspecialist bench.
48
3. Opinions. - The deciding judge has complete discretion in a
section 12(2) case whether to write an opinion or to dispatch the case
by means of a formulaicjudgment ("the Court being satisfied that there
can be no reasonable doubt that the said deceased intended the said
piece of paper to constitute his Will," 4 9 probate is ordered). Twenty-
one of the forty-one section 12(2) cases have resulted in opinions, all
published or forthcoming in the local reporter, the South Australian State
Reports.5 0 The remaining 20 cases, decided without opinions,5 1 I shall
46. For discussion and criticism ofjudicial processing of uncontested cases, see in-
fra text accompanying notes 174-89. The three contested cases in order of decision
were Baumanis v. Praulin, 25 S.A. St. R. 423 (1980); Kelly (also styled Duggan v. Hal-
lion), 32 S.A. St. R. 413, aff'd, 34 S.A. St. R. 370 (1983); Hodge, 40 S.A. St. R. 347
(1986). (Mohr, J.). Two further cases originated in solemn form but were not seriously
contested, hence were processed more like common form cases. In Radziszewski (also
styled Lalic v. State of South Australia), 29 S.A. St. R. 256 (1982), the testator was
wholly without heirs, and there would have been an escheat to the state if the will failed.
The state was therefore represented as an adverse party. "Counsel who appeared for
the State of South Australia made it clear that whilst putting the plaintiff to proof and
not consenting to any orders, she was nevertheless not opposing the order sought. She
did not call any evidence." 29 S.A. St. R. at 257. In Dale (also styled Dale v. Wills), 32
S.A. St. R. 215 (1983), the disputants settled the case after having commenced it in
solemn form. "In effect there is no contest here," the judge explained. "I am told that
the parties have settled the matter of the administration of the estate, subject to the
order which I am asked to make today [validating the defectively executed will for pro-
bate]." 32 S.A. St. R. at 218.
47. Rules of the Supreme Court (Administration and Probate Act) 1984, Rule 61,
discussed infra text accompanying notes 188-91.
48. A three-judge appellate panel, called the Full Court, is built from the Supreme
Court, and any of the judges (currently there are 14) may draw duty on an appeal. The
single judge at first instance has authority to refer a case of exceptional importance to a
three-judge first-instance panel; this step was taken in the landmark Williams case, 36
S.A. St. R. 423 (1984), discussed infra text accompanying notes 113-19, in which the
court validated an unsigned will. Of the contested cases under § 12(2), only one has
been appealed. Kelly, 34 S.A. St. R. 370 (1983), affg 32 S.A. St. R. 413 (1983).
49. Gallasch, No. 89 of 1982, order (S.A. Sup. Ct. July 12, 1982) (Bollen, J.).
50. Following are the 21 cases in which opinions have issued, listed in order of date
of decision:
Graham, 20 S.A. St. R. 198 (1978); Baumanis v. Praulin, 25 S.A. St. R. 423 (1980);
Kurmis, 26 S.A. St. R. 449 (1981); Kolodnicky, 27 S.A. St. R. 374 (1981); Standley, 29
S.A. St. R. 490 (1982); Radziszewski, 29 S.A. St. R. 256 (1982); Crocker, 30 S.A. St. R.
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hereafter refer to as the unreported cases; for these cases I have in-
spected the underlying documents, which are public records, in the
registry in Adelaide.
4. The Registrar's Memoranda. - The reported section 12(2) cases
make occasional reference to various of the unreported cases.5 2 When
I began to study section 12(2) cases, I found this somewhat baffling. I
wondered how either counsel or court would know to cite such prece-
dents. Indeed, since no opinion has issued in an unreported case, it
was something of a puzzle to know what precisely the court was citing
when it gave the name and docket number of such a case. Upon inquiry
in South Australia, I learned of a practice that explains this use of unre-
ported cases. In probate matters that require judicial decision, the pro-
bate registrar prepares a memorandum for the information of the
court. (A copy is preserved with the official case file in the probate reg-
istry.) The memorandum summarizes the facts as they appear from
pleadings and affidavits, reviews the relevant legal authorities, and rec-
ommends an outcome. Thejudges occasionally acknowledge the influ-
ence of these memoranda in published opinions.53 When compared
321 (1982); Clayton, 31 S.A. St. R. 153 (1982); Possingham, 32 S.A. St. R. 227 (1983);
Dale, 32 S.A. St. R. 215 (1983); Kelly, 32 S.A. St. R. 413, affd, 34 S.A. St. R. 370 (1983);
Blakely, 32 S.A. St. R. 473 (1983); Williams, 36 S.A. St. R. 423 (1984); Hollis, 37 S.A. St.
R. 27 (1984); Eva Smith, 38 S.A. St. R. 30 (1985); Roberts, 38 S.A. St. R. 324 (1985);
Lynch, 39 S.A. St. R. 131 (1985); Ryan, 40 S.A. St. R. 305 (1986); Bennet, 40 S.A. St. R.
350 (1986) (Bollen,J.); Kraehe, 40 S.A. St. R. 347 (1986) (Matheson,J.); Hodge, 40 S.A.
St. R. 398 (1986) (Mohr, J.).
51. The 20 cases are listed in the order of decision date, a sequence that sometimes
differs from filing date. The file number cited after each case name is that assigned in
the probate registry, where the pleadings, affidavits, orders, and other litigation papers
are kept. Included among these 20 cases is the one thus far decided by the probate
registrar pursuant to his authority under Rule 61, on which see supra note 47, infra text
accompanying notes 185-87.
Pavilavskas, No. 494 of 1978 (S.A. Sup. Ct. Aug. 1, 1979) (Zelling,J.); Whibley, No.
159 of 1979 (S.A. Sup. Ct. Aug. 13, 1979) (Mohr, J.); Gallasch, No. 89 of 1982 (S.A. Sup.
Ct. July 12, 1982) (Bollen, J.); Middlemiss, No. 145 of 1982 (S.A. Sup. Ct. Sept. 13,
1982) (Mohr, J.); Ball, No. 309 of 1982 (S.A. Sup. Ct. Dec. 13, 1982) (White, J.);
Sanderson, No. 237 of 1982 (S.A. Sup. Ct. Dec. 13, 1982) (WhiteJ.); Sierp, No. 173 of
1982 (S.A. Sup. Ct. Dec. 13, 1982) (White, J.); Halliday, No. 329 of 1982 (S.A. Sup. Ct.
Apr. 11, 1983) (White, J.); Pointon, No. 105 of 1983 (S.A. Sup. Ct. July 11, 1983)
(Sangster, J.); Franks, No. 10 of 1983 (S.A. Sup. Ct. Aug. 9, 1983) (Cox, J.); Almyna
Smith, No. 190 of 1983 (S.A. Sup. Ct. Aug. 9, 1983) (Cox, J.); Steel, No. 338 of 1982
(S.A. Sup. Ct. Aug. 9, 1983) (Cox, J.); Welter, No. 104 of 1983 (S.A. Sup. Ct. Aug. 9,
1983) (Cox, J.); Horton, No. 284 of 1983 (S.A. Sup. Ct. Jan. 17, 1984) (Zelling, J.);
Phillips, No. 263 of 1983 (S.A. Sup. Ct. Feb. 13, 1984) (White, J.); Brown, No. 45 of
1983 (S.A. Sup. Ct. Apr. 10, 1984) (MilhouseJ.); Robertson, No. 92 of 1984 (S.A. Sup.
Ct. Aug. 13, 1984) (Matheson,J.); Rodger, No. 79 of 1985 (S.A. Sup. Ct. May 29, 1985)
(order of the registrar, A. Faunce de Laune, pursuant to Rule 61); Pudney, No. 240 of
1984 (S.A. Sup. Ct.June 11, 1985) (OlssonJ.); McFarlane, No. 114 of 1985 (S.A. Sup.
Ct. Sept. 9, 1985) (O'Loughlin, J.).
52. E.g., Roberts, 38 S.A. St. R. 324, 325, 326 (1985); Kolodnicky, 27 S.A. St. R.
374, 379 (1981); Kurmis, 26 S.A. St. R. 449, 454 (1981).
53. See, e.g., Eva Smith, 38 S.A. St. R. 30, 31 (1985) (Bollen, J.) ("I begin by ac-
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with the resulting judgment, a memorandum will sometimes be found
to have served as the draft judgment.
The registrar's memoranda have made possible the precedential
life of the unreported section 12(2) cases. The registrar understood
the potential importance of section 12(2) from its inception, and he
kept track of the cases, including the unreported ones.5 4 His memo-
randa consistently cite both the reported and the unreported cases.
Although an unreported case may lack an explicit rationale, the implicit
rationale in the typical section 12(2) matter is easily discernible from
the facts and the outcome.
C. The Patterns of Case Law
The forty-one cases applying section 12(2) sort themselves into
five categories, 55 which I shall follow in discussing the law that has de-
veloped. Two of the categories involve the attestation requirements.
Fully one-third of all section 12(2) cases arise from situations in which
knowledging the great assistance which I have had from a memorandum prepared for
me by the Registrar of Probates."); Roberts, 38 S.A. St. R. 324, 326 (1985); Kolodnicky,
27 S.A. St. R. 374, 385 (1985). See also the reference to the registrar's memorandum at
the end of the passage quoted supra note 45.
54. The 20 unreported cases that are cited in this Article have been identified for
me by the registrar as the total cohort of such cases that had been decided as of the time
I concluded my research for this Article, in June of 1986. A few more cases were pend-
ing at that time.
Facts that I narrate when discussing an unreported case come from the witnesses'
affidavits or from the summary of those affidavits in the registrar's memorandum. A
laconic one-or-two page judicial decree will have reported the result; see the example
quoted supra text accompanying note 49.
55. The following table counts 46 applications of § 12(2) in the 41 cases. The dis-
crepancy arises because a few cases contain more than one sort of defect.
Section 12(2) Cases
Category of Defect Instances
Attestation: Presence 14
Attestation: Number 9




The cases as categorized in the table follow. Within each category, cases are listed
in the sequence that they were decided. Citations for all cases appear supra notes
50-51.
Presence: Graham, Whibley, Kolodnicky, Standley, Ball, Sanderson, Dale, Pointon, Almyna
Smith, Steel, Horton, Phillips, Rodger, McFarlane.
Number: Radziszewski, Crocker, Clayton, Halliday, Kelly, Franks, Phillips, Eva Smith,
Hodge.
Unsigned will: Baumanis v. Praulin, Blakely, Williams, Pudney.
Misplaced signature: Pavilavskas, Welter, Brown, Phillips, Hollis, Roberts, Kraehe.
Alteration: Kurmis, Standley, Gallaseh, Middlemiss, Sierp, Possingham, Steel, Horton, Rob-
ertson, Lynch, Ryan, Bennet.




the testator failed to comply with the requirement that he sign in the
presence of at least two witnesses present at the same time (hereinafter,
"presence" cases). In the other set of attestation cases, one or both of
the required witnesses were missing (hereinafter, "number" cases).
Two further groups of section 12(2) cases arise from the requirement
that the testator sign his will. In a small set of these cases there is no
signature at all (hereinafter, "unsigned will" cases). A larger group in-
volves wills in which the testator signed on the first page or pages, but
not at the end (hereinafter, "misplaced signature" cases). Finally, there
is a sizeable and intriguing category, in which the testator attempted
without adequate Wills Act formality to revise or to add provisions to a
previously executed will (hereinafter, "alteration" cases).
In the exposition that follows, I shall review the five categories of
case law. I shall then direct attention to two large issues of policy that
emerge from the experience to date. First, I discuss why the standard
of proof needs some tinkering.56 Second, I explain why the litigation
levels, which may look high, have been bloated as a result of a foible of
local probate procedure that is not integral to the harmless error rule
and that need not be repeated elsewhere should other jurisdictions
choose to emulate the South Australian dispensing power. Under
South Australian probate procedure, section 12(2) requires judicial val-
idation of a defective will. The parties cannot handle the matter con-
sensually. Most of the section 12(2) cases, although they evincejudicial
applications of the dispensing power, are not genuinely contested.
5 7
D. Attestation
1. Presence. - The first case, Graham,58 was decided in November
1978, almost three years to the day after the enactment of section
12(2). The facts are typical enough of the presence genre. An ailing
testatrix signed her will in private and sent her nephew, the principal
beneficiary, to "get it witnessed" by a pair of neighbors. 59 The attesta-
tion thus violated the requirement of section 8 of the South Australian
Wills Act that the testator sign "in the presence of two or more wit-
nesses present at the same time." 60 The will had been drafted by an
officer of a trust company in accordance with the testatrix' instructions
and without involvement by the nephew, so there was no ground to
suspect imposition. The testatrix' signature was independently veri-
fied. The judge, Jacobs, J., concluded: "Upon these facts, I have not
the slightest doubt that the deceased intended the document which is
56. See infra text accompanying notes 157-73.
57. See infra text accompanying notes 174-89.
58. 20 S.A. St. R. 198 (1978).
59. Id. at 201.
60. Wills Act Amendment Act (No. 2) of 1975, § 5, amending Wills Act of 1936,
§ 8(b), 8 S. Austl. Stat. 665, 668.
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before me to constitute her will."6 1
Virtually every subsequent reported section 12(2) opinion has
cited Graham, and many have glossed its key passage, in which the judge
discusses how to apply the statute's tersely worded standard. Section
12(2) requires the court to be "satisfied that there can be no reasonable
doubt that the deceased intended the document to constitute his
will."' 62 But since an execution defect might signal irresolution or
worse, how can a judge satsify himself as the statute requires that the
decedent did in fact mean the document to be his will? Jacobs, J. rea-
soned that
in most cases, the greater the departure from the require-
ments of formal validity dictated by [the Wills Act], that is to
say, to the extent that those requirements have not been...
observed, the harder will it be for the Court to reach the re-
quired state of satisfaction. For example, I do not think I
could have reached that state of satisfaction in the present case
if the deceased had done no more than sign the will .... 63
The main insight in this passage has been endorsed incessantly, 64
although later case law declined to follow the particular dictum that
section 12(2) could not cure a wholly unattested will.65 What matters
in excusing a Wills Act defect is "the extent" of the departure from
Wills Act formality; hence "the greater the departure ... the harder"
the case. This is a profoundly purposive interpretation of section
12(2). The court must distinguish between a formal breach that im-
pairs the purposes of the Wills Act and one that does not. Presence
defects are almost always innocuous, because the presence requirement
is so peripheral to the main evidentiary, cautionary, and protective poli-
cies of the Wills Act. A larger departure-for example, failure of the
testator to sign the will-is far more likely to have impaired the Wills
Act policies, and is correspondingly more difficult to excuse under sec-
tion 12(2).
Graham was the first of fourteen presence cases. 66 In all fourteen
61. 20 S.A. St. R. at 201.
62. Wills Act Amendment Act (No. 2) of 1975, § 9, Amending Wills Act of 1936,
§ 12(2), 8 S. Austl. Stat. 665, 669 reprinted supra text accompanying note 31.
63. 20 S.A. St. R. at 205.
64. See, e.g., Eva Smith, 38 S.A. St. R. 30, 33 (1985); Williams, 36 S.A. St. R. 423,
428 (1984); Clayton, 31 S.A. St. R. 153, 156 (1982).
65. See infra text accompanying notes 71-87. A similar dictum two paragraphs
earlier, 20 S.A. St. R. at 205, concluding that "unsigned documents ... would not come
within the ambit of s[ection] 12(2)" has also been disaffirmed, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 101-16.
66. See supra note 55. Presence defects occur far more often than come to light.
Ordinarily, the presumption of due execution that arises from a seemingly regular attes-
tation clause forecloses inquiry into the actual circumstances of execution. When, how-
ever, a will lacks an attestation clause or exhibits indicia of irregularity such as alteration
or interpolation, proofs are taken on the circumstances of execution, and presence de-
fects may then be discovered.
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the defective instruments have been validated. The detail is not worth
recounting. Most of the cases are unreported, and all involve uninter-
esting variations on the facts in Graham. It does not much matter why
people botch the presence requirement, so long as there is no evidence
to suggest imposition.67 What Americans are likely to find peculiar
about these cases is that they get litigated at all, since the outcome is
mostly foregone. I shall return to that subject below, when discussing
litigation levels under section 12(2).68
2. Number. - There have been seven cases in which the will ap-
peared totally unattested69 and two more in which the will was attested
by only one witness. 70 In contrast to the innocuous presence cases,
cases that instance total failure of attestation have presented some diffi-
cult tests of section 12(2). Presence is peripheral to the Wills Act poli-
cies, but attestation is not. The attestation process sets will making
apart from daily routine, warning the testator of the seriousness of what
he is signing. Attestation evidences deliberation and finality; attesting
witnesses may, if needed, give evidence of the circumstances of execu-
tion, and they provide some protection against imposition.
a. Unattested Wills. - The first important 71 case to raise total fail-
ure of attestation involved especially compelling facts. In Crocker,72 the
court validated a will executed in 1941 on a Royal Australian Air Force
form. The form had wrongly declared that a serviceman on active duty
could make an unwitnessed will. Inferring that the decedent had relied
67. It should be remarked that the ability to remedy presence defects under the
dispensing power has the incidental effect of foreclosing liability for professional mal-
practice in the case in which the presence defect arises in a professionally drafted will.
Presence defects seldom occur when a professional draftsman supervises execution, but
they do arise in the situation in which the lawyer or other draftsman releases the will for
the testator to execute without supervision. It would not be surprising to see malprac-
tice liability develop in American law for failure to supervise execution. See Johnston,
Legal Malpractice in Estate Planning-Perilous Times Ahead for the Practitioner, 67
Iowa L. Rev. 629, 650-52 (1982). For recent authority, see Persche v. Jones, 387
N.W.2d 32 (S.D. 1986) (will attested out of testator's presence held void, and banker
who negligently supervised execution held liable for damages for unauthorized practice
of law).
68. See infra text accompanying notes 181-89.
69. Hodge, No. 2349 of 1984 (S.A. Sup. Ct. Mar. 13, 1986) (Mohr, J.); Eva Smith,
38 S.A. St. R. 30 (1985); Franks, No. 10 of 1983 (S.A. Sup. Ct. Aug. 9, 1983) (Cox, J.);
Kelly, 32 S.A. St. R. 413, affd, 34 S.A. St. R. 370 (1983); Clayton, 31 S.A. St. R. 153
(1982); Crocker, 30 S.A. St. R. 321 (1982); Radziszewski, 29 S.A. St. R. 256 (1982).
70. Halliday, No. 329 of 1982 (S.A. Sup. Ct. Apr. 11, 1983) (WhiteJ.); Phillips, No.
263 of 1983 (S.A. Sup. Ct. Feb. 13, 1984) (White, J.).
71. An earlier case, Radziszewski, 29 S.A. St. R. 256 (1982), dealt with the less in-
teresting situation of attesting witnesses who had been present but had not subscribed
when the testator signed. The weakened testator signed by mark, and the opinion is
devoted to the conventional issue of whether a mark constitutes a signature (it does).
The attestation defect is dismissed with a passing remark that "compliance with (the
relevant sections of the Wills Act] is no longer essential (see [section] 12(2))." Id. at
259.
72. 30 S.A. St. R. 321 (1982).
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upon this mistaken notice, the court enforced the will under section
12(2). What makes this such an intuitively correct result, despite the
testator's total noncompliance with the attestation requirement, is that
the cause of his noncompliance was explained and shown to be harm-
less. The court protected his quite reasonable reliance upon official
misinformation.
The testator in Crocker was essentially blameless, but section 12(2)
has been applied in later unattested will cases in which the testator was
more responsible for the defect. The morose testator in Franks,7 3 for
example, committed suicide by rifleshot in his kitchen. On the kitchen
table he left two envelopes, one containing his unwitnessed will, the
other a signed letter addressed to the principal beneficiary. The letter
recited: "It may not be a true will in the legal sense but under the
circumstances I think it will be legal and binding." 74 Virtually nowhere
else in the world (apart from holograph jurisdictions) would this brave
and untutored prediction have proved correct, but under section 12(2)
the judge concluded that the document expressed the testator's intent
and ordered it probated.
The testator who pulled the trigger appreciated the finality of his
unwitnessed will. In other unattested-will cases the evidence has been
less clear. In Eva Smith,75 the unattested will of an elderly testatrix was
found after her death among other valuable papers in an envelope at
her hospital bedside. The will was a printed form with inked fill-ins.
Instructions on the back of the will form emphasized the need for attes-
tation. The judge, Bollen, J., posed the right question when consider-
ing whether to probate the will under section 12(2). "Is it possible that
she had written it out but delayed complying with necessary formalities
whilst deliberating about what she had 'provided' in the document?" 76
Attestation evidences finality. When the formality is lacking, the court
must satisfy itself that the want of attestation does not indicate irresolu-
tion. The judge did so:
The established facts are that the deceased was very old, that
she told her grand-niece that she had written out a will, that no
later will exists, that she took the document with other valua-
ble papers with her to the hospital, and ... that she provided
for those to whom one would have expected her to leave her
73. No. 10 of 1983 (S.A. Sup. Ct. Aug. 9, 1983) (Cox, J.).
74. Document headed "Letter to Hilary Ignatious Keane," in the probate file in
Franks, No. 10 of 1983 (S.A. Sup. Ct. Aug. 9, 1983) (Cox, J.).
75. 38 S.A. St. R. 30 (1985).
76. Id. at 33. Another peculiarity of the document that could indicate irresolution
was that the words "Lindy 8 (Ward)" are jotted in the margin of the will, at right angle
to the text. The judge thought it "likely that [the notation] refer[red] to someone, per-
haps a nurse, in Ward 8 of the Royal Adelaide Hospital when the deceased was there."
Id. at 34. He continued, "I can see no relevant significance in this writing." Id. But if
she thought the document was her will, why was she using it as a notepad? Answer:
Somebody confined in a hospital bed may not always have a lot of options.
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estate .... Despite her mental acuity in old age I am satisfied
beyond reasonable doubt that age must have caused her to
overlook the need for witnesses.
77
On behalf of the testator in Hodge,78 the latest of the unattested will
cases, not even frailty can be pleaded in defense of his failure to obtain
attestation. He was simply stubborn. He took a booklet supplied by a
firm of funeral directors for the purpose of aiding prospective survivors
in making funeral arrangements, and he turned it into a will. Where
the booklet had a section to be filled in beginning "My will is lodged
with . . . " the testator wrote: "This is my Will and whatever I leave
behind is the property of my daughter Mrs. V. Thoreson. ' ' 79 He
showed this invention to the daughter, who told him that a will needed
two witnesses. "The deceased said to her that, in effect, he did not
want to be bothered with that, it was perfectly plain," since he had
signed the document and dated it.80 The court found no evidence of
fraud or imposition and validated the will under section 12(2).
What makes Hodge a hard case is that the testator had been warned
that his instrument might be defective. It is hard to say of a testator
who deliberately sets out to breach the governing formalities that he
nevertheless intended the instrument to be effective as his will. But
Hodge is not quite that case, because the warning that the testator re-
fused to heed came only from a family member and not from an author-
itative figure such as his lawyer.8 1
The most difficult of the unwitnessed will cases is Kelly.8 2 Dr.
Kelly, the testator, was a physician who, late in life, had studied law and
qualified at the bar. A few weeks before his death in February 1981, Dr.
Kelly handed his housekeeper a notebook, saying to her, "Use these for
your notes." The notebook was discovered to contain a page in Dr.
Kelly's hand, headed "My last will and testament." The document bore
his signature, was dated October 17, 1980, and concluded: "Written as
I have considerable cardiac pain and irregularity at time." The evi-
dence showed that Dr. Kelly had been investigating making certain
charitable devises, for which this document did provide.8 3
The trial judge probated the document under section 12(2) despite
the want of attestation. "If the document were meant merely as in-
structions or an aide-memoire," the judge reasoned, "there would be no
point in his signing it, dating it, and writing an explanation for his lack
of proper formality."'8 4 Although there was evidence that on the day of
77. Id. at 33-34.
78. 40 S.A. St. R. 398 (1986).
79. Id., at 399.
80. Id.
81. For further discussion of the significance of attempted compliance, see infra
text accompanying notes 117-18.
82. 32 S.A. St. R. 413, aftd, 34 S.A. St. R. 370 (1983).
83. Id. at 414-16.
84. Id. at 417.
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his death Dr. Kelly had spoken as though a devise omitted from this
document but contained in an earlier will were still in effect, the judge
thought that "there can be no reasonable doubt that Dr. Kelly at the
time of the making of the 1980 document... intended that document
to constitute his will. Whether having done so remained in his memory
or not... [is] in my opinion not to the point."8 5 The decision was
sustained on appeal.8 6
Granting that the document was written under conditions of ap-
prehended peril such that, had Dr. Kelly then died, the court ought to
have exercised its power under section 12(2) to excuse noncompliance
with the attestation requirement, it is much harder to excuse his failing
to get the document attested after he recovered. When a legally-
trained testator recites in the defectively executed instrument that he is
making it on account of a medical emergency, his subsequent failure to
procure attestation once events allowed is consistent with the view that
it was intended at the time of its making to be provisional. Dr. Kelly's
instrument is therefore open to interpretation as a conditional will, in-
tended to take effect if he had died of the immediate peril, but allowed
to lapse when not re-executed with Wills Act formality after the passing
of the peril.
8 7
I find Kelly particularly difficult to reconcile with the high standard
of proof that section 12(2) imposes. Recall that the judge's duty is not
only to ascertain that "the deceased intended the document to consti-
tute his will," but also to be "satisfied that there can be no reasonable
doubt" about it.88 To say that Kelly is at best a close case is to call into
question whether it could be correctly decided on so high a standard of
proof. I shall return to the subject of whether the South Australian
courts are meeting this standard; and whether, as a matter of statutory
design, it is wise to impose that standard.89
Notice that in a holograph jurisdiction the document in Kelly would
have qualified as a complying instrument, since the testator wrote it by
hand and signed it. The gist of holographic formality is to dispense
with attestation when the testator handwrites the will.90 Some of the
85. Id. at 418.
86. 34 S.A. St. R. 370 (1983).
87. This point was raised on appeal and dismissed lightly, see 34 S.A. St. R. at 383:
"There is nothing in the document... which makes the will conditional in that respect.
The addendum at the end simply provides the reason why the testator found it urgently
necessary to make a will as he did." This passage is question-begging. Precisely the
issue that arises in a case in which the testator has made a recital of inducement is
whether the recital is a condition or a mere explanation. The court asserts the latter
without rationale. I have indicated in text why the contrary is the better view.
88. Wills Act Amendment Act (No. 2), of 1975, § 9 amending Wills Act of 1936,
§ 12(2), 8 S. Austl. Stat. 665 reprinted supra text accompanying note 31.
89. See infra text accompanying notes 157-73.
90. The holograph requirements are discussed supra text accompanying note 4.
The question of construction in Kelly (whether the language of the addendum rendered
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need for section 12(2) in South Australia arises because in that state (as
in all Australian jurisdictions) the Wills Act does not authorize holo-
graphs. In Manitoba, which enacted a variant of the South Australian
dispensing power in 1983, the courts have been content to handle
under the local holograph statute some cases that in South Australia
would have been dealt with under section 12(2).91
b. Partial Attestation. - From the willingness of the South Austra-
lian courts to validate wholly unattested wills under section 12(2), it
followed that they would not hesitate to enforce partially attested wills.
There have been two cases, both unreported, in which the testator
thought that one witness would suffice. The courts have held the error
harmless both times. 92 The key facts in Phillips93 are worth recounting,
because the same blunder occurs in one of the few cases arising under
the Queensland statute discussed below.94 The will was witnessed by a
justice of the peace (JP), who is a lay officer armed with a rubber stamp
in the fashion of an American notary. It seems that the misimpression
is current among s6me of these JPs that attestation by a single JP satis-
fies the Wills Act. In South Australia under section 12(2) the court pro-
tected the testator's mistaken reliance.
3. Overview on Attestation. - Half the section 12(2) cases to date
have involved defective compliance with the attestation rules (presence
and number). The courts have excused the error every time. By con-
trast, we shall see that the first unsigned will case failed under section
12(2), and that no oral will case has even been brought. Practice under
the purposive standard of section 12(2) has rightly discerned that writ-
ing and signature are more purposive than attestation. Because writing
and signature have greater evidentiary and cautionary value, they are
much harder to dispense with under section 12(2).
Having spent time on legislative drafting committees in recent
years, I have become newly sensitive to the multiplicity of purposes that
statutes may intend, and to the paucity of means available for drafters
to signal whether a particular requirement serves a major value or a
trivial one. Drafters feel that they must speak in one voice: command.
The choice is felt to be between commanding and omitting, even when
what is wanted is more in the way of recommendation, instruction, or
the document conditional) would remain in issue in a holograph jurisdiction, although
the testator's failure to procure attestation after recovering from the apprehended peril
would no longer bear on the issue. See also infra note 235 (discussing tension between
two levels of formality in holographic jurisdictions).
91. See infra note 234 and accompanying text.
92. The second case, Phillips, No. 263 of 1983 (S.A. Sup. Ct. Feb. 13, 1984) (White,
J.), is discussed next in text. In the other, Halliday, No. 329 of 1982 (S.A. Sup. Ct. Apr.
11, 1983) (White, J.), an elderly testatrix took the counsel of a lay companion that a will
needed one attesting witness.
93. No. 263 of 1983 (S.A. Sup. Ct. Feb. 13, 1984) (White, J.).
94. Henderson, No. 860 of 1985 (Queensl. Sup. Ct. Sept. 27, 1985) (Macrossan,J.),
discussed infra text accompanying notes 209-14.
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exhortation. Thus, the Wills Act insists upon the marginal presence
requirement of the attestation ceremony in the same terms that it calls
for the fundamentals of writing and signature.
South Australia's section 12(2) provides an indirect cure. It leaves
the Wills Act formalities unaltered but allows the courts to excuse in-
stances of harmless noncompliance. Yet one way to describe the effect
of section 12(2) as seen in the attestation cases is to say that section
12(2) has reduced attestation from a requirement to an option.95 Non-
compliance is hardly an enticing option, even for the stubborn, since (if
detected 96) it throws one's estate into litigation. Hence, few testators
have elected this option-to be precise, twenty-three testators of whom
we know, mostly blunderers, have done it, out of tens of thousands of
testators during the decade that section 12(2) has been in force.
E. Signature
1. Unsigned Will. - The second reported section 12(2) case,
Baumanis v. Praulin,97 reached the courts in 1980. Validation was re-
fused to a will that the testator had not signed. A clergyman drafted the
will at the testator's request. When the will was typed up and brought
to the testator's hospital bedside for signing, he expressed his approval
but insisted that the document be retyped to include a couple of small
changes. He died before the clergyman could return with the revision.
The court refused to probate either draft under section 12(2). The
judge admitted that there could be "no doubt that the [first draft] ...
represents what the deceased intended his will to contain and that he
intended to sign as his last will and testament a document in similar
form but with the minor variations ."98 Nevertheless, the court
refused to validate it.99
Baumanis is an illuminating and fortunate precedent for limiting the
application of the dispensing power. Many a testator decides not to
execute a will that has been prepared to his instructions. One of the
things you can do with a draft will is decide you do not want to use it.
Signature is the formality that permits us to distinguish between drafts
and wills. Decide such a case the other way °00 and the risk arises that
95. See supra text accompanying note 15.
96. Because the witnesses' signatures must appear on the face of the will, partial or
total failure of attestation cannot escape detection. A presence defect, by contrast, must
be proved by means of extrinsic evidence from the attesting witnesses or from others,
and proofs will be taken on this question only if something irregular (such as the want of
an attestation clause) puts the matter in issue. See supra note 66.
97. 25 S.A. St. R. 423 (1980).
98. Id. at 425.
99. Id. at 426.
100. A NewJersey court has just managed to blur the distinction between draft and
will, applying that state's ungovernable "probable intent" doctrine in order to construe
as a holographic will a signed letter of instructions for the drafting of a will that the
testatrix delivered to her lawyer. Smith, 209 NJ. Super. 356, 507 A.2d 748 (Super Ct.),
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any unsigned draft, any scrap of paper, can be argued to be an intended
but unexecuted will.
By contrast, in Blakely,' 01 the court validated an unsigned will in
circumstances where it was highly appropriate to do so. Blakely was
what American academics in the trusts and estates field tend to call a
Pavlinko case, after the wretched Pennsylvania precedent of that
name.10 2 All these cases have identical facts. Wills are prepared for
husband and wife. At the execution ceremony the wills become
switched: the husband mistakenly signs the will prepared for his wife
and the wife signs the will prepared for her husband. When presented
with the will that the husband signed in Pavlinko, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, tracking language from a nineteenth-century prece-
dent, declared that " 'he had executed no will and there was nothing to
be reformed. There was a mistake, it is true, but that mistake was the
same as if he had signed a blank sheet of paper.' "o103 Of course, there is a
world of difference between the conduct of the testator who signs a
blank sheet of paper; and the testator who mistakenly executes the
wrong document with full Wills Act attestation intending that the right
document should constitute his will. White, J., sitting in Blakely had no
trouble applying the section 12(2) dispensing power to the will that the
husband signed, because "[t]he circumstances of intention to constitute
this document his will are here so convincing .... 1,04 And he persua-
sively distinguished Baumanis, "because the document there submitted
for probate was only a draft. The deceased never intended to sign that
draft at all."' 10 5
Blakely necessarily became the definitive precedent for how this re-
current situation would be handled under section 12(2). The next time
a switched-wills case arose, the South Australian court viewed it as rou-
tine and validated the will without opinion.
0 6
It is interesting to notice that the New York Court of Appeals re-
cently departed from common law tradition without the aid of statute in
another of these switched-wills cases, Snide.'0 7 The court ordered the
mistakenly signed will admitted to probate. The court was concerned
certif. granted, 104 NJ. 461, 517 A.2d 446 (1986). For contrary cases that correctly
distinguish between ordering a draft and signing a will, see, e.g., Moore, 443 Pa. 477,
277 A.2d 825 (1971); Price v. Huntsman, 430 S.W.2d 831 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
101. 32 S.A. St. R. 473 (1983).
102. Pavlinko, 394 Pa. 564, 148 A.2d 528 (1959).
103. Id. at 567-68, 148 A.2d at 529-30 (quoting Alter's Appeal, 67 Pa. 341 (1871)
(emphasis added)).
104. 32 S.A. St. R. at 476.
105. Id. at 480.
106. Pudney, No. 240 of 1984 (S.A. Sup. Ct.June 11, 1985) (OlssonJ.).
107. 52 N.Y.2d 193, 418 N.E.2d 656, 437 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1981). For a more detailed
discussion of Snide, see Langbein & Waggoner, Reformation of Wills on the Ground of
Mistake: Change of Direction in American Law?, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 521, 562-66 (1982).
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to limit its holding to this "very unusual case," 108 but the factors it
mentions are those that would be important under a general harmless
error rule-the high quality of the evidence of harmlessness ("what has
occurred is so obvious, and what was intended so clear"); 10 9 and fidel-
ity to the purposes of the Wills Act: "The instrument in question was
undoubtedly genuine" and was "executed with statutory formality ....
There is absolutely no danger of fraud."1 10
The switched-wills cases cause our subject of Wills Act execution
blunders to overlap with an otherwise distinct doctrine, the rule forbid-
ding reformation of wills afflicted with mistaken terms. The testator in
Blakely can be thought to have left his will unsigned (an execution er-
ror), or-when signing the will prepared for his wife-to have executed
a will containing mistaken terms. As Snide and other cases evince, there
has been some willingness in American law in recent years to relax the
no-reformation rule."' There are signs in Australian law reform cir-
cles that the development of a harmless error rule for execution mis-
takes is encouraging a rethinking of the no-reformation rule. 1 2 These
developments raise the prospect that Anglo-American law will move to
a unitary mistake doctrine for errors of both types-mistake in the exe-
cution and mistake in the terms.
In the most challenging of all the section 12(2) cases, Williams, 113
the South Australian court validated an unsigned will that was more
problematic than the switched-wills cases. Husband and wife, a farm
couple about to leave on a journey, decided to write new wills, which
they did in longhand and without professional help. Neighbors were
summoned to attest both wills at a kitchen-table execution ceremony
the next morning. The husband signed his will, and the neighbors at-
tested both wills, but only two years later upon the wife's death was it
noticed that she had not signed her will. Probate was sought under
section 12(2). The attesting witnesses testified that they had not no-
ticed at the time of the execution ceremony that the wife had not
signed. They explained that the wife "was busily engaged preparing
for the annual Jamestown Agricultural & Horticultural Show," which
was to take place the day before the couple's departure. 14 One of the
testatrix' sons testified to a conversation with both parents two days
after the bungled execution, in which "he was informed by his parents
that they had prepared their wills in their own handwriting in the event
that something should happen to them on their tour." 11 5 The court
108. 52 N.Y.2d at 196, 418 N.E.2d at 658, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 65.
109. Id. at 196, 418 N.E.2d at 657, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 64.
110. Id. at 197, 418 N.E.2d at 657-58, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 64-65.
111. See Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 107, at 521-22, 555-66.
112. See infra text accompanying notes 224-25.
113. 36 S.A. St. R. 423 (1984).




validated the will. Legoe, J., relied on Blakely, the South Australian
Pavlinko case, as authority for the proposition that an unsigned will
could be validated under section 12(2). He then reasoned that this
testatrix had carried out unequivocal acts which satisfy the cri-
teria of the section. She had done everything consistent with
the formal and conclusive act of making (in this case writing it
out in her own hand) and completing her last will except that
she did not sign it. She set the stage for such a complete act.
Her actions in writing out the document, contacting the wit-
nesses, being present at the time of attestation of the wills, and
writing the word 'Wills' on the envelope in which the two doc-
uments were placed were in my opinion final and conclusive
evidence of her clear intentions in relation to that document.
Furthermore she was present and silently confirming the exist-
ence and the probative effect of the document which she be-
lieved to be her will when her son... was shown the will by
her husband [two days later].' 16
Thus, the court concluded that the testatrix, in an addled moment,
omitted to sign a will that she meant to sign, in circumstances in which
her conduct was deliberate enough to satisfy the purposes of the
formality.
Although I accept the court's premises, I have reservations about
the decision to validate the unsigned will in this case. I agree that, in
emphasizing the testatrix' attempt at compliance, the court was di-
recting attention to a factor of fundamental importance. Under the
functionally similar Statute of Frauds, when the question is whether to
allow a party to prove that an instrument lacks an intended term or
contains a misrendered one, the courts have been willing to excuse the
want of writing when there is strong evidence that the parties were at-
tempting to have the instrument contain the term. 117 As under the
Statute of Frauds, so under the Wills Act: Attempt is purposive. Defec-
tive compliance is not as good as perfect compliance, but it is much
better than (and much different from) noncompliance. This point was
well put in one of the misplaced signature cases discussed below,
Roberts, in which White, J. directed attention to "the efforts of the de-
ceased to go through those formalities of execution which are required
by law. The steps taken toward ensuring due execution are as capable
as actual signature of demonstrating the deceased's intention .... 118
Nevertheless, the question in Williams is whether the testatrix' con-
duct was purposive enough, whether she really was attempting to sign
the will (as the testators in the switched-wills cases so clearly were). An
explanation other than inadvertence can be suggested for the testatrix'
116. Id. at 434.
117. See the discussion in Palmer, Reformation and the Statute of Frauds, 65 Mich.
L. Rev. 421, 423 (1967).




failure to sign the will. She might, for example, have had reservations
about the will, and she may craftily have left it unsigned in order to
disarm it without upsetting her husband. Under the beyond-reason-
able-doubt standard of proof, the burden of excluding such a possibil-
ity rests on the proponents and is very hard to discharge. On the other
hand, this will replaced a prior will, and if the changes were modest,1 1 9
the court's finding would be more plausible. In any event, regardless of
whether the extraordinarily difficult Williams case is correctly decided,
there is little reason to fear that future courts could confuse such a situ-
ation with an unsigned draft in a case like Baumanis.
2. Misplaced Signature. - There is a convention of testation in
England and Australia that gives rise to a class of execution errors
scarcely known in the United States. Professionally drafted wills, in-
cluding those prepared by trustee companies as well as by lawyers,
commonly provide lines for the testator and the attesting witnesses to
sign at the foot of each page when a will extends over more than one
page.' 20 Seven of the section 12(2) cases 121 raise the question of what
to do when the testator signs the first page or pages, but omits to sign
at the end where his signature is required.
122
I have a particular reason for wanting an American readership to
pause over these cases, even though the genre falls outside our familiar
set of recurrent Wills Act execution blunders. 123 I think these cases
illustrate one of the great advantages of a harmless error rule: its ten-
dency to displace sleight-of-hand and to promote candor. When I first
wrote in 1975 about the likely consequences of a harmless error rule, I
pointed out that the traditional strict compliance rule tended to drive
sympathetic courts into strained interpretations of what constituted
119. The testatrix had made a previous will with a trustee company in 1969, and a
prime objective in making the new will was to eliminate the trustee company as executor
in order to save the fees. 36 S.A. St. R. at 426. The opinions in the case do not disclose
how closely the new will conformed to the substance of the former will.
120. The phenomenon is described as "excessive execution" in W.A. Lee, Manual
of Queensland Succession Law 52 (2d ed. 1985). The purpose "is to guard against an
unauthorised interpolation." Id.
121. See cases listed supra note 55.
122. The South Australian Wills Act requires that the testator sign the will "at the
foot or end thereof." Wills Act, 1936, § 8(a), 8 S. Austl. Stat. 665, 668 (1975). This
provision derives from the English Wills Act of 1837, 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict., ch. 26, § 9.
Some American jurisdictions, most prominently New York, have been troubled with the
"at-the-end" requirement, which the Uniform Probate Code does not retain. See T.
Atkinson, Handbook of the Law of Wills § 64, at 303-07 (2d ed. 1953).
123. There is an echo of the misplaced signature problem in American law in what
has become known as the "Boren problem," after the unfortunate Texas case, Boren v.
Boren, 402 S.W.2d 728 (Tex. 1966). In these cases, the testator signs the self-proving
affidavit on a self-proving will, but not the earlier testimonium clause of the will itself.
The courts have voided the wills. For a collection of the cases and a withering critique,




compliance with the relevant formality.1 24 In a presence case like
Groffman, 12 5 for example, where each witness was in the next room
while the other attested, most courts invalidate the will. But not all.
Some courts have squirmed and used the fiction of "conscious pres-
ence" to conclude that since the two witnesses were close enough for
each other and for the testator to be conscious of their presence, their
conduct satisfied the strict compliance standard. 126 The trouble with
such tricks is that it is so hard to predict whether the equities in a partic-
ular case will prove sufficiently appealing to inspire the court to indulge
in the pretense. Thus, at least for execution defects of the near-miss
type, the rule of strict compliance may actually promote litigation, by
inciting courts to bend the ostensible rules in ways that make the out-
comes hard to predict.
In the South Australian misplaced execution cases, the candid stan-
dard of section 12(2)-that is, well-proven testator's intent-has dis-
placed another of the devices that grew up to bend the strict
compliance rule. Before the enactment of section 12(2), the South Aus-
tralian courts had been able to rescue the wills in some of the misplaced
execution cases by the expedient of disregarding the unsigned last page
and enforcing only the signed first page(s). Two difficulties beset this
strategem. First, it cannot be used when the unsigned last page con-
tains substantive provisions whose omission would distort the disposi-
tive plan of the instrument. Further, the reason that professionals want
the testator and attesting witnesses to sign the first page(s) is to identify
all the pages as genuine and integrated, 127 whereas execution with at-
testation at the end shows that the testator utters the document with
finality. Signature on the first page(s) may not be commensurate in
purpose with signature at the end.
In Pavilavskas,128 the first of the misplaced signature cases to arise
after section 12(2), Zelling,J. validated the will under the old strategem
rather than under the dispensing power. That is, he ordered the signed
first page probated without the unsigned second page that contained
only boilerplate. However, as the courts became more comfortable
with section 12(2), all the later misplaced signature cases 129 were de-
cided under the dispensing power, and it is now hard to imagine the
South Australian courts returning to the older strategem. In Hollis,'3s
the judge said that he would have used the strategem' 3' had section
124. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 6, at 525-26.
125. [1969] 1 W.L.R. 733 (Q.B.), discussed supra text accompanying notes 7-8.
126. See 2 W. Bowe & D. Parker, supra note 43, § 19.125, at 240-41.
127. Regarding the integration doctrine, see T. Atkinson, supra note 122, § 79, at
380.
128. No. 494 of 1978 (S.A. Sup. Ct. Aug. 1, 1979) (Zelling, J.).
129. See cases listed supra note 55.
130. 37 S.A. St. R. 27 (1984).
131. In South Australia the strategem is known as the rule in Robertson, 2 S.A. St.
R. 481 (1972). In the penultimate paragraph of his opinion in Hollis, Matheson, J. says
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12(2) not been available to him. More recently, in Roberts,132 the judge
refused a litigant's motion to employ the strategem and insisted on ap-
plying section 12(2). The harmless error rule has, therefore, substi-
tuted candor for sleight-of-hand in this class of case.
F. Alteration
In our concluding category of section 12(2) cases, the testator
starts with a validly executed will, which he then amends without ade-
quate formality. Sometimes the testator simply adds a clause, that is, he
tries to interpolate a defectively executed codicil. More frequently, the
amendment has the character of a revision: The testator crosses out
former text and inserts replacement terms.
These revision cases entail an overlap with revocation formality,
since the testator is attempting to set aside the old terms as well as to
substitute the new. Revocation formality is much the same throughout
the Anglo-American world. The statutes authorize revocation either by
physical act or by written instrument. Revocation by writing requires
full Wills Act formality. 133 Because the formal requirements for revo-
cation by writing and for execution are essentially the same, the South
that, absent § 12(2), "the proper decision would be ... to admit to probate only the first
three pages" of the four-page will. 37 S.A. St. R. at 30.
132. 38 S.A. St. R. 324 (1985). The case involved a two-page will that had been
signed on the first page only. "Initially, the widow applied for probate of the first page
only as that page clearly complied with the formalities required by s[ection] 8 of the
[Wills] Act," said White, J. "However, I could see no reason why probate should not
also be granted with respect to the second page. In this case the contents of the second
page are not important but in another case they might be." Id. at 325.
Contrast the predicament of American courts, which are still left to choose between
total and partial invalidity in equivalent circumstances. For a recent instance of the lat-
ter, in which a law-office stapling error caused the testatrix to sign one page before the
residuary clause, see Mergenthaler, 123 Misc. 2d 809,474 N.Y.S.2d 253 (Nassau County
Sur. Ct. 1984). The residue was made to pass by intestacy. (I owe this reference to John
A. Wallace).
133. See, e.g., U.P.C. § 2-507(1). The point requires more demonstration than the
present Article allows, but I believe that the requirement of Wills Act formality for revo-
cation by writing is unwise. The gist of my view is contained in my statement to the
British Columbia Law Reform Commission:
The rationale seems to be since it takes Wills Act formality to make a will, it
should take Wills Act formality to unmake a will. But we are not consistent
about that, since we allow revocation by physical act, yet when the testator at-
tempts to revoke by writing, we insist on Wills Act formality. In truth, virtually
all the permitted modes of revocation by physical act are intrinsically more am-
biguous than revocation by writing, even when the writing lacks Wills Act for-
mality. Physical act without more must be ambiguous on the questions whether
the act was (a) done by the testator, and (b) done with animus revocandi. An
unwitnessed writing is always clearer on this point.
Law Reform Commission of British Columbia, Report on the Making and Revocation of
Wills 67-68 (1981) [hereinafter British Columbia Report]. The New South Wales com-
mission has recently endorsed such a change in the law, to allow a will to be revoked "by
any writing on the will or dealing with it, which is done by the testator" or at his direc-
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Australian courts have not had to distinguish them in most of the revi-
sion cases. The courts typically discuss the new language being in-
serted rather than the old language being struck.
In the first of the alteration cases, Kurmis,134 the court erred in re-
fusing to apply section 12(2), but later cases have effectively overruled
Kunnis.I3 5 The testator in Kurmis had a properly executed will contain-
ing two handwritten devises filled in on a printed will form. Sometime
later he interpolated a third devise, but he did not reexecute the will.
The court found that the testator added the third devise "with the in-
tention that the addition should form part of his will,"' 3 6 but the court
refused to enforce the addition because it was "unexecuted," that is, it
had not been undertaken with fresh signature and attestation.
The court, relying on Baumanis v. Praulin, 137 treated the situation in
Kurmis as though it were an unsigned will case. But there is a material
difference between a case like Baumanis, where the testator never signs
the will, and Kurmis, where he attempts to amend an instrument that he
has previously executed properly. The testator in Baumanis had never
taken the step of executing his will. He had not crossed the line from
draft to will. In Kurmis, by contrast, the testator had long since taken
that step; indeed, it so impressed him that he sought to take advantage
of its effect by adding a further term to the document that he had al-
ready executed. The addition was in the testator's own hand, so there
could be no doubt about its genuineness. Because the court found that
the testator could only have intended "that that addition should form
part of his will," the court was wrong to refuse to enforce the term
under section 12(2).
A year later, in the second alteration case, Standley,138 the court
applied section 12(2) to validate the will. That precedent has captured
the field, and all subsequent alteration cases have been decided in favor
of validation (except for one case in which the court was apparently not
satisfied that the alteration was the work of the testator).13 9 The testa-
tion in his presence. New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Wills: Execution and
Revocation § 5.12, at 62 (1986) [hereinafter New South Wales Report].
134. 26 S.A. St. R. 449 (1981).
135. The process of overruling Kurmis began with Standley, 29 S.A. St. R. 490
(1982), discussed infra text accompanying notes 138-41. For a later, although still cir-
cumspect disavowal, see the remarks of Legoe, J., in Williams, 36 S.A. St. R. 423, 434
(1984).
136. 26 S.A. St. R. at 450.
137. 25 S.A. St. R. 423 (1980).
138. 29 S.A. St. R. 490 (1982).
139. Horton, No. 284 of 1983 (S.A. Sup. Ct.Jan. 16, 1984) (Zelling,J.). Thejudge
applied § 12(2) to cure a presence defect but refused to validate a provision designating
a trustee for fear that it had been subsequently interpolated. A transcript shows that
Neil Lowrie, counsel for the proponents, attempted to assure the court that although the
provision "seems to be in a little different hand," the testator was suffering from an
ailment that could have produced such variances. Zelling, J. replied that "[o]n the bal-
ance of probabilities I would have very little difficulty in saying yes that is a perfectly
[Vol. 87:1
EXCUSING HARMLESS ERROR
trix in Standley took pen and ink to her previously executed will and
crossed out the name of the executor. She interlineated the name of
somebody else, initialed, and had a witness initial. The court enforced
the amendment under section 12(2), saying that "the only satisfactory
explanation for an act of alteration" otherwise untainted was intent to
alter.140
The court in Standley distinguished Kurmis on the ground that the
testator in Kurmis had not initialed his interpolation, as had the testatrix
and a witness in Standley. This is not a persuasive ground of distinction.
If the underlying will in Standley to which the amendment had been fast-
ened had not been properly signed and attested, it seems unlikely that
the court would have enforced the initialed document with or without
the modification. Initialling is helpful but hardly conclusive in showing
deliberateness and genuineness. What makes the result in Standley intu-
itively correct is that the testatrix worked her modification on a will that
was already properly executed; but so did the testator in Kurmis.
I believe that the correct analysis in all the alteration cases that
have thus far arisen under section 12(2) is that the testator meant the
modification to relate back to the prior will not only in substance, but also
in form. The testator's error was in thinking that the prior execution had
continuing effect. When the circumstances establish that the alteration
was untainted by fraud or imposition, the error is harmless. By way of
analogy, note that American law follows a similar rule for subsequent
modifications to holographs. Fresh execution (that is, new signature) is
not required.141 The only plausible rationale for such a rule is that the
modification relates back to the original signature, or put differently,
that the original signature has continuing effect when the testator alters
the will.
There have been ten further alteration cases since Standley. 142 A
few of them are worth recounting in order to suggest the range of the
genre. Middlemiss143 instances an unattested codicil. Beneath the signa-
tures on her properly attested will the testatrix subsequently typed in a
paragraph making specific devises of heirlooms to each of her three
children. She signed the addition but did not procure attesting wit-
nesses. The court validated the addition under section 12(2). The re-
sult in Middlemiss is surely a fortiori to cases like Franks144 and Hodge145
that allow wholly unattested wills; an unattested codicil is a less serious
reasonable argument. Unfortunately the section requires me to be satisfied beyond rea-
sonable doubt." Transcript of Proceedings at 2 (Jan. 16, 1984).
140. 29 S.A. St. R. at 495.
141. See Cuneo, 60 Cal. 2d 196, 384 P.2d 1, 32 Cal. Rptr. 409 (1963); Stanley v.
Henderson, 139 Tex. 160, 162 S.W.2d 95 (1942).
142. See the full list tabluated supra note 55.
143. No. 145 of 1982 (S.A. Sup. Ct. Sept. 13, 1982) (MohrJ.).
144. No. 10 of 1983 (S.A. Sup. Ct. Aug. 9, 1983) (Cox, J.), discussed supra text
accompanying note 73.
145. 40 S.A. St. R. 398 (1986) discussed supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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departure from Wills Act formality, because the underlying instrument
has been attested.
In Bennet 146 the court applied section 12(2) to a pure revocation
case. The testatrix drew two lines across a clause of her will, deleting a
devise to a boyfriend with whom her relationship had cooled. She
wrote the date and her signature in the margin. The court enforced the
deletion. American specialists will recognize that we would reach the
same result by a different means under the UPC14 7 or in a non-UPC
jurisdiction that allows partial revocation by physical act. We would
treat the testatrix' markings as cancellation under the physical-act revo-
cation statute. Thus, section 12(2) has now been used in South
Australia to make up for the want of a partial revocation statute.
148
Perhaps the most difficult of the alteration cases is an unreported
one, Sierp.149 The testator's professionally drafted will created several
shares in a remainder interest in his residence. By cross out and inter-
lineation he altered these shares, carefully signing each alteration.
These are by now routine facts for this class of case. What sets Sierp
apart is that the testator subsequently took the altered will to a solicitor
for safekeeping. The solicitor perused it, noticed the modification,
warned the testator that it did not comply with the Wills Act, and rec-
ommended that a new will be drafted. The testator had the solicitor
draft a new will, which the testator later fetched and took away unexe-
cuted. The solicitor met the testator socially on several subsequent oc-
casions and reminded him to have the will executed, but the testator
apparently never did, and this later document was not found after his
death.
When the testator's blunder is a knowing one, our inclination is to
say that the error is not harmless. If the testator knew that he was not
complying with the Wills Act, the likely inference is that he did not want
146. 40 S.A. St. R. 350 (1986) (BollenJ.).
147. See U.P.C. § 2-507(2).
148. In Lynch, 39 S.A. St. R. 131 (1985), § 12(2) had the effect of avoiding another
archaic rule of transplanted English law. The testatrix executed her will in 1977 when
her name was Eileen Ramsey. In 1979, she married her companion of long standing,
Lynch. Her adult son by a former marriage advised her that she would need to change
her name in her will. This she subsequently did in a variety of ways. At the heading of
the will she struck out "Ramsey" and substituted the words "Lynch nee," obviously, as
the judge remarked; "under the misapprehension that the word 'nee' means 'formerly,'
not 'born.'" At the foot of the first page of the will, she wrote "Mrs. EJ. Lynch"; and
alongside her original signature at the end of the will she wrote "now Mrs. E.J. Lynch."
She later showed the altered will to her son, who advised her to initial where she had
altered the heading of the will, which she did in his presence. South Australia has the
old English rule that when a testator marries, his will is entirely revoked, but he may
revive the revoked will by reexecuting it. Wills Act of 1936, §§ 20(1), 25(1), 11 S. Austl.
Stat. 570. The court in Lynch applied § 12(2) to hold that the testatrix' conduct in
renaming herself in the will constituted adequate compliance with the reexecution
requirement.
149. No. 173 of 1982 (S.A. Sup. Ct. Dec. 13, 1982) (White, J.).
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to comply. Intentional noncompliance belies testamentary intent. But
closer analysis shows that intentional noncompliance is not a fair de-
scription of what happened in Sierp. Sierp began as a conventional inno-
cent blunder case. Only well after the testator had altered the will was
he put on notice the alteration required further formality. Since the
will as altered would have been routinely enforced under section 12(2)
when altered, the question is whether subsequent notice somehow viti-
ates the section 12(2) remedy, perhaps by estoppel: Those claiming
through the testator's amendment are estopped from pleading the
amendment because he had knowledge of its formal insufficiency.
Against that notion, however, is the conventional time-of-execution
standard that so dominates the law of wills: what determines testamen-
tary intent is the testator's state of mind at the time he executes, or
here, modifies, the will. If the testator intended the modification to be
valid when he made it, what he subsequently learned and wanted does
not matter unless he acts again to conform the will to the subsequent
state of mind.
Sierp thus resembles that difficult unattested will case, Kelly,'
50
where the testator, fearing imminent death, hastily penned and signed a
will in a household notebook. The trial judge emphasized the time-of-
execution standard, saying that at the time of the making of the emer-
gency will the testator "intended the document to constitute his will.
Whether having done so remained in his memory or not... [is] not to
the point."' 1 It is difficult to gainsay this argument on its own terms.
I have criticized the result in Kelly on the ground that the particular
language that the testator used suggested that he meant the will to be
provisional. In that connection it seemed relevant that the testator was
legally trained and thus likely to have known of the attestation require-
ment for wills. But the underlying time-of-execution standard that the
court was applying seems right in that case, and it seems likely to have
been the factor that disposed the court to validate the will in Sierp. The
issue is what the testator knew when he executed the will, or in an alter-
ation case, when he made the modification.
G. Reforming the Reform
I have reviewed at some length the case law that has arisen under
section 12(2) in order to supply readers with a basis for evaluating the
reform. I suspect that most readers will share my admiration for what
the South Australian courts have done with the dispensing power. 152
The courts could have sabotaged so laconic a piece of legislation. In-
150. 32 S.A. St. R. 413, aftd, 34 S.A. St. R. 370 (1983).
151. Id. at 418, discussed supra text accompanying note 85.
152. I know only one dissenting Australian voice, an apprehensive article by a prac-
titioner published before the South Australian case law had taken shape. Ormiston, For-
malities and Wills: A Plea for Caution, 54 Austl. LJ. 451 (1980).
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stead, they have taken its message to heart. Graham,'53 the first section
12(2) case, sounded the theme that has echoed through the later case
law. The purpose of section 12(2), Jacobs, J. said, "is to avoid the
hardship and injustice which has so often arisen from a strict applica-
tion of the formal requirements of a valid will.' 1 54 In the difficult Kelly
case, Bollen, J. pointed to the "liberal and pragmatic" character of the
case law. "Section 12(2) is meant to have a very significant practical
effect," he said. 155 It has.
When presented with a defectively executed will, South Australian
courts are now allowed to ask the right question, which is whether the
document embodies the unequivocal testamentary intent of the dece-
dent. As so often happens in the law, if you get the question right, it is
much easier to get the answer right. One can quibble here or there
with an outcome among the corpus of section 12(2) cases, as I have
with the result in Kelly, but when looked at in its entirety, the case law
appears overwhelmingly successful. Justice is being done where it pre-
viously was not.
The natural course of events in matters of fundamental law reform
is that experience suggests avenues of refinement. I conclude this dis-
cussion of the South Australian developments by directing attention to
a pair of shortcomings 156 in the current practice. The standard of
proof in section 12(2) needs modest repair. So does the procedure for
processing harmless error cases that the parties are prepared to settle
but that present law requires to be adjudicated.
1. Standard of Proof. - Under section 12(2) the court can validate
a defectively executed will only if persuaded that there is "no reason-
able doubt" that the decedent intended it to be his will.'5 7 This be-
yond-reasonable-doubt standard (hereafter, BRD) originates in the
criminal law, where it serves the special purpose of tilting the scales in
favor of liberty for an accused who is threatened with penal sanctions.
The BRD standard is virtually never transposed to private law. 58
"Proof beyond reasonable doubt is ... the highest standard of proof
known to the law,"' 159 said Zelling, J. in Kelly.
In some section 12(2) cases, adherence to the BRD standard would
have required the courts to frustrate well-proven testator's intent under
a remedial statute that was designed to achieve the opposite. The
courts have not been willing to allow that to happen. Instead, 'they have
153. 20 S.A. St. R. 198 (1978).
154. Id. at 202.
155. Kelly, 34 S.A. St. R. at 389.
156. Other minor defects in the statutory drafting are mentioned supra text accom-
panying notes 35-36.
157. Wills Act Amendment Act (No. 2) of 1975, § 9 amending Wills Act of 1936,
§ 12(2), 8 S. Austl. Stat. 665, reprinted supra text accompanying note 31.
158. 9J. Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials
at Common Law § 2498, at 421-31 (Chadbourn rev. 1981).
159. Kelly, 34 S.A. St. R. at 384.
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weakened the BRD standard while purporting to apply it. Kelly is the
obvious example. Whether the will was provisional, as I think, or un-
conditional, as the court held, 160 the evidence for the court's view is too
equivocal to satisfy the criminal law standard of proof. Or recall
Williams,161 the case of the seemingly addled testatrix who neglected to
sign her will at the farmhouse kitchen table execution ceremony that
she and her husband convened. I have suggested how something other
than inadvertence might account for her failure to sign her will-that
she might have wanted to sabotage it without upsetting her husband.
Under a BRD standard, it is not enough that the proponent's theory be
the more persuasive; the proponent's case must exclude plausible con-
trary accounts. The courts would not have imposed serious criminal
sanctions on evidence of the quality seen in Kelly or Williams. Doubts of
similar force could be marshalled in other section 12(2) cases 162 that
may seem correctly decided as a matter of testator's intent, but not on a
BRD standard.
It is possible to interpret the holdings of the South Australian
courts as fashioning an unconventional meaning for the BRD standard.
Since the standard is novel outside the criminal law, the courts have
been free to devise a civil BRD standard in place of the criminal one. A
civil BRD standard would require proof higher than the mere-prepon-
derance standard in ordinary civil matters, but short of the conven-
tional criminal BRD standard. Reworked in that way, the BRD standard
would approximate the standard of clear and convincing (hereafter,
C&C) evidence that has become familiar in American law for civil mat-
ters of special seriousness.
The C&C standard is prominent in several spheres of the American
law of gratuitous transfers. In the law of wills it is applied in suits to
prove the existence or contents of a lost will 16 3 and where a contract to
make a will (or not to revoke one) is asserted. 164 In the law of nonpro-
bate transfers, the C&C standard governs actions to reform deeds,
trusts, insurance contracts, and the like, when the claim is that the
160. See supra text accompanying note 87.
161. 36 S.A. St. R. 423 (1984).
162. See, e.g., Eva Smith, 38 S.A. St. R. 30 (1985), discussed supra text accompany-
ing notes 75-76; Clayton, 31 S.A. St. R. 153 (1982). In Clayton, the decedent's cohabi-
tant testified that she found his will on a household chest. It was signed but not attested.
It named her the primary beneficiary. The court relied upon her self-serving testimony
about purported lifetime statements of the decedent indicating that the document re-
flected his testamentary intent, even though the printed-form will plainly called for at-
testation. I suspect that the decisive fact that allowed the court to find for the beneficiary
in Clayton was that the testator's next of kin (who would have taken on intestacy had the
will failed) consented to the application for probate. See id. at 154. On the relationship
between the courts' handling of the BRD standard and the uncontested character of
much of the South Australian litigation, see infra text accompanying note 189.
163. See 3 W. Bowe & D. Parker, supra note 43, § 29.156, at 726-28.
164. B. Sparks, Contracts to Make Wills: Legal Relations Arising Out of Contracts
to Devise or Bequeath 24-27 (1956).
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draftsman or the typist misrendered the contents. 165 Because these
doctrines deal with problems of mistake in the terms, they resemble
closely our subject of mistake in the execution and thus constitute an
especially cogent analogy.
As a matter of policy, the justification for imposing an afforced
standard of proof in a particular field of doctrine is, in the words of
Justice Harlan, "to instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of con-
fidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness" of his fact-
finding in that class of case.' 66 We understand why the drafters of the
South Australian statute sought a higher-than-ordinary standard of
proof for dispensing with Wills Act formality. They were inviting litiga-
tion about an issue of great importance, an issue that due compliance
with the Wills Act forecloses, namely, whether to treat an imperfect in-
strument as a will. The standard should not, however, have been ex-
pressed as BRD. As I shall discuss in greater detail in Part IV of this
Article, several Commonwealth law reform commissions have ex-
amined the South Australian dispensing power and recommended simi-
lar legislation for their jurisdictions, but they have had qualms about
the BRD standard of proof. British Columbia, Manitoba, and New
South Wales have rejected the BRD standard.1 67 The Western Austra-
lia report recommends keeping it, partly in order to achieve consistency
with South Australia and thus to avoid creating "uncertainty as to the
relevance in Western Australia of the South Australian precedents."168
The Commonwealth law reform commission reports show discom-
fort at having to choose between the criminal BRD standard, which
they sense to be excessive, and the ordinary civil standard of proof,
which does not seem adequate to the seriousness of the issue involved
in deciding whether to enforce a defectively executed will. Curiously,
the C&C standard, which seems so apt for these circumstances, has not
crystallized in the Commonwealth legal systems as a distinct standard
of proof, although English and Commonwealth cases sometimes speak
of the need for especially "convincing" or "cogent and conclusive" evi-
dence in circumstances in which American law uses the C&C stan-
dard. 169 The New South Wales commission seems to want the C&C
standard, but not quite to know how to ask for it. Its report recom-
165. See discussion in Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 107, at 524-26.
166. Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970).
167. British Columbia Report, supra note 133, at 53-54; Manitoba Law Reform
Commission, Report on "The Wills Act" and the Doctrine of Substantial Compliance
27-29 (1980) [hereinafter Manitoba Report]; New South Wales Report, supra note 133,
§§ 6.33-6.34, at 73.
168. Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, Report on Wills: Substantial
Compliance 52 (1985) [hereinafter Western Australia Report].
169. For discussion of the requirement of "convincing proof" for rectification of
inter vivos instruments of transfer, see New South Wales Report, supra note 133, § 7.26,
at 88. The "cogent and conclusive" formulation appears in the classic sham will case,
Lister v. Smith, 3 Sw. & Tr. 282, 289, 164 Eng. Rep. 1282, 1285 (1863).
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mends the ordinary civil standard, but explains: "We assume that the
courts would in fact require a standard of proof approximating that for
rectification," 170 that-is, for reformation of deeds, where the local stan-
dard is "convincing proof."'
71
The widespread longing for an afforced standard of proof in these
cases, coupled with the equally widespread sense that the criminal stan-
dard is misapplied in civil litigation, leads me to believe that the C&C
standard strikes the appropriate balance. Even granting, as some al-
lege, 172 that the C&C standard is hard to define and to enforce, its hor-
tatory effect, cautioning the trier that the issue is one of special
seriousness, is worth preserving.
I have elsewhere suggested that under a substantial compliance
doctrine, the proponent's burden of proof should be the ordinary pre-
ponderance-of-the-evidence standard. 173 The requirement that the
testator must have complied substantially with the Wills Act is without
counterpart under the dispensing-power type of harmless error rule,
and it serves much the function of an afforced standard of proof. Com-
plying substantially necessarily involves conduct that evinces unmistak-
able testatmentary intent. On the other hand, for precisely that reason,
little harm would be done if an explicit C&C standard were superim-
posed upon the substantial compliance doctrine.
2. Uncontested Cases and Litigation Levels. - Perhaps the most recur-
rent concern in discussions about the merits of a harmless error rule for
Wills Act execution blunders is the fear of a litigation imbroglio. A
harmless error rule opens for litigation an issue of potential difficulty
that the traditional strict compliance rule forecloses, namely, whether
to enforce a defectively executed will. At first glance, the South
Australian data looks worrisome. Over the space of half a dozen years
in a smallish jurisdiction, 174 some forty-one lawsuits about harmless er-
ror have had to go to judgment, and the observer may well wonder
what larger iceberg looms beneath that tip.
Astonishingly, this seeming litigation boomlet turns out to be
170. New South Wales Report, supra note 133, § 6.34, at 74.
171. Id. § 7.26, at 88.
172. See McBaine, Burden of Proof: Degrees of Belief, 32 Calif. L. Rev. 242,
251-54 (1944).
173. Langbein, supra note 1, at 1194. A functionally equivalent substantial compli-
ance doctrine governs defective compliance with life insurance change-of-beneficiary
designations; no standard of proof beyond the ordinary civil preponderance-of-the-evi-
dence standard has emerged. See, e.g., National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Neuhoff,
140 Ind. App. 603, 224 N.E.2d 690 (Ct. App. 1967).
174. In the 1980's, the population of South Australia has hovered around
1,300,000. Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Demographic Statistics: Septem-
ber and December Quarters 1984, at 8 (Table 5) (1985). Grants of representation,
mostly of testate estates, numbered 5368 for 1980, 5565 for 1981, 5537 for 1982, 5334
for 1983, and 5103 for 1984. "Record of Grants Issued," unpublished document sup-
plied by the Registrar of Probates, Dec. 1985 (on file at the Columbia Law Review).
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largely illusory. Of the forty-one cases, only three have been genuinely
contested.' 75 Virtually none of the others would have resulted in adju-
dication, or even in litigation, had they arisen in a typical American ju-
risdiction that had adopted a comparable harmless error rule.
Section 12(2) magnifies a weakness in the underlying probate pro-
cedure of South Australia. The jurisdiction does not have a modem
rule facilitating consensual suppression of a purported will. As a result,
most of the section 12(2) cases are being litigated by people who would
rather waive their rights or settle out of court. Consider, for example,
Kurmis,176 in which the question was whether or not to enforce the tes-
tator's unattested interpolation of a $5,000 devise to a grandchild born
after the execution of the will. The court noted that the residuary devi-
see whose share would have borne the loss of the $5,000 was the testa-
tor's son, the grandson's father, "who has already taken steps to see
that the testator's grandson ... will indeed receive his $5,000 whatever
the Court may decide."' 177 The costs of the litigation were charged to
the estate, where they were also borne by the father. He was, therefore,
required to conduct and to pay for a lawsuit that he wanted to concede.
Almyna Smith, 178 one of the unreported presence-defect cases, sup-
plies a scandalous example. The decedent's son was the sole benefici-
ary under her defectively attested will; he was also her sole heir in
intestacy. Under no outcome would he have taken less than the whole
of her estate. Nevertheless, proofs had to be gathered and adjudication
conducted at his expense in order to determine that, pursuant to sec-
tion 12(2), he took under the will rather than by descent.
Try as they might, the parties cannot waive their rights. In
Gallasch,179 where the testator's unattested alteration increased his
widow's share at the expense of their children, the registrar's memo-
randum advised the court: "The children have all consented to the al-
teration not being admitted to proof," that is, the children waived their
right to complain that the alteration had not been executed with proper
formality; "however in view of section 12(2) I did not consider that it
was optional for the applicants to elect whether or not the alteration
should be admitted."' 180 Consequently, the widow had to pay her solic-
itor to obtain proofs and procure judicial validation on the issue that
her children wanted to concede.
The passage just quoted from the registrar's memorandum in
Gallasch seems to say that section 12(2) requires this pointless litigation,
but the memorandum speaks in shorthand. The problem lies not in
section 12(2), but in the way section 12(2) interacts with the underlying
175. See cases listed supra note 46.
176. 26 S.A. St. R. 449 (1981).
177. Id. at 454.
178. No. 190 of 1983 (S.A. Sup. Ct. Aug. 9, 1983) (Cox, J.).
179. No. 89 of 1982 (S.A. Sup. Ct. July 12, 1982) (Bollen, J.).
180. Gallasch, registrar's memorandum, at 5.
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probate procedure of the jurisdiction. When the personal representa-
tive applies for probate (of a testate estate) or for administration (of an
intestate estate), he must file an oath-either that the proffered docu-
ment is the decedent's last will, or that the decedent died intestate.18 '
Before the enactment of section 12(2), a defectively executed will or
alteration could not have been enforced, and the personal representa-
tive could tender his oath without hesitation even when such a docu-
ment existed. Now, however, because section 12(2) allows imperfect
instruments to be validated, the personal representative is thought to
be obliged to bring forward a plausible one for proofs. He cannot sup-
press what may be the will.
Under American law, by contrast, there is ample authority for al-
lowing the beneficiaries under a purported will to waive their rights, so
that the estate may pass under a prior will or through intestacy.' 82 If
South Australia had this pro-waiver rule, section 12(2) would work far
more smoothly. The reform would then operate for the most part in
private channels rather than in the courts. Obviously, if waiver were
permitted, litigation would never arise in a case like Almyna Smith, where
the outcome could not have varied regardless of whether section 12(2)
saved the will; nor in cases like Kurmis and Gallasch, where the family
circumstances were tranquil and the persons entitled to complain pre-
ferred to disregard the execution defect. Likewise, cases that arise in
well-settled categories of section 12(2) doctrine would not be litigated
under the American pro-waiver rule, for all the reasons that people do
not in general bring hopeless lawsuits. For example, if waiver were per-
mitted in South Australia, it is hard to imagine a presence defect being
litigated under section 12(2) in the absence of suspicious circum-
stances, since the dispensing power so routinely leads to validation of
the wills in such cases.
183
There has been a little discomfort in South Australia, although not
as much as one would expect, about this phenomenon of pointless liti-
gation under section 12(2).184 In 1984, the South Australian Supreme
Court took a slight step toward ameliorating the problem. It adopted a
rule of court, Rule 61, that authorizes the probate registrar to process
section 12(2) matters on simplified proofs and without judicial ratifica-
181. Court rules prescribe the forms of oath. Form 12 has the executor swear his
belief that the paper he is producing contains the last will of the decedent. Form 21 has
the administrator swear that the deceased died intestate. Rules of the Supreme Court
(Administration and Probate Act) 1984, at 43, 48.
182. See Annotation, Family Settlement of Testator's Estate, 29 A.L.R.3d 8,
102-10 (1970); Annotation, Family Settlement of Intestate Estate, 29 A.L.R.3d 174, 190,
228-29 (1970).
183. See supra text accompanying notes 58-68.
184. It appears from the report in Kolodnicky, 27 S.A. St. R. 374, 385 (1981), that
the probate registrar sought the court's guidance on whether the parties might be al-
lowed to waive their rights under § 12(2), but he was rebuffed.
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tion when the estate in question has a gross value of $10,000 or less.18 5
Rule 61 stops well short of what is needed. The limitation to tiny es-
tates has so hobbled Rule 61 that only a single case has thus far been
processed under it.186 The recent New South Wales Law Reform Com-
mission report that endorses the South Australian dispensing power
also favors a procedure like Rule 61, but without limitation of amount.
"[T]he requirement of consents to the application is a sufficient protec-
tion to justify vesting in the Registrar a jurisdiction with no monetary
limitation,"18 7 the report says. Actually, the commission's rationale has
a much broader reach: The consents of all affected parties should be
"sufficient protection" for dispensing with litigation altogether.
The stark truth is that as a result of the no-waiver rule, section
12(2) has left many of the people it has touched worse off than if the
reform had never been enacted, since it has forced them to pay for law-
suits that nobody wanted and that would not have been required before
section 12(2) came into effect. I reiterate, however, that the flaw is not
with section 12(2), but with the no-waiver rule of the probate proce-
dure. In effect, the no-waiver rule turns section 12(2) into a litigation
tax on the beneficiaries of blundering testators. South Australia and
the other Commonwealth jurisdictions that are adopting the dispensing
power solution for Wills Act execution blunders should abrogate the
no-waiver rule, either by rule of court or by legislation.
The essentially uncontested character of most of the South
Australian case law has inevitably impaired its quality. Legoe, J., com-
plained in a candid passage in one of the early cases about his predica-
ment in having to "decide this 'first-time up' question of interpretation
after hearing one counsel, putting one argument, and then relyfing]
upon the muscular strength that I could gain from arguing with myself
on the point."188 In particular, it seems unlikely that the South Austra-
lian courts could have been so lenient in applying the BRD standard of
proof had opposing counsel been regularly engaged.
18 9
185. Rules of the Supreme Court (Administration and Probate Act) 1984, Rule 61.
186. Rodger, No. 79 of 1985 (S.A. Sup. Ct. May 29, 1985) (order of the registrar,
A. Faunce de Laune). Quite apart from the larger critique of the no-waiver rule being
voiced in text, there is a technical flaw in Rule 61. The rule limits the registrar's jurisdic-
tion to estates of $10,000 or less. The ceiling should have been expressed not on the
estate but on the amount in issue. As it now stands, Rule 61 cannot apply to a codicil of
trivial value if the estate exceeds the $10,000 ceiling. See, e.g., Middlemiss, No. 145 of
1982 (S.A. Sup. Ct. Sept. 13, 1982) (Mohr, J.), discussed supra text accompanying note
143, where § 12(2) was needed to validate a noncomplying codicil to an otherwise valid
will.
187. New South Wales Report, supra note 133, § 6.38 n.65, at 79. The Western
Australia commission also endorses Rule 61. Western Australia Report, supra note 168,
at 56-57.
188. Kolodnicky, 27 S.A. St. R. 374, 376 (1981).
189. See, e.g., Eva Smith, 38 S.A. St. R. 30 (1985), discussed supra text accompany-
ing notes 75-76; Clayton, 31 S.A. St. R. 153 (1982), discussed supra text accompanying
note 162. The question is whether, at least unconsciously, the judge thinks, "If the peo-
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South Australia's litigation boomlet does have its silver lining, at
least for students of the harmless error rule. Because the jurisdiction
has insisted on litigating a mass of cases that should have been ignored
or settled, it has generated a stock of precedents that have sketched the
contours of the harmless error rule. In an odd sense, therefore, the
South Australian experience with the dispensing power provides the
best of both worlds. It supplies a detailed case law that illumines the
working of the harmless error rule, yet it gives no cause to fear that the
reform would produce significant litigation levels in a jurisdiction that
allowed noncourt processing of uncontested estates.
III. QUEENSLAND'S STATUTORY SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE RULES
The state of Queensland adopted a substantial compliance doc-
trine in 1981.190 Three recent cases have interpreted the measure so
narrowly as to render it nearly useless. The sad experience under the
substantial compliance doctrine in Queensland contrasts strongly with
the principled development of the dispensing power in South Australia.
For jurisdictions that have yet to choose a harmless error rule, the
Queensland courts have probably sealed the fate of the substantial
compliance doctrine as a statutory solution to the problem of harmless
execution errors. The dispensing power will command future
legislation.
The Queensland legislation resulted from a large-scale review of
Queensland probate and succession law that the Queensland Law Re-
form Commission commenced in 1973.191 The commission reported
in 1978 and its recommendations were largely implemented in the Suc-
cession Act of 1981.192 The distinguished scholar of trust and succes-
sion law, W.A. Lee, had a strong hand in framing the report and in
drafting the legislation, and he took a particular interest in the harmless
error problem. Working before the South Australian dispensing-power
legislation of 1975 had attracted any attention or case law, Lee decided
to draft a statute that would essentially codify the substantial compli-
ance doctrine as I had developed it in my 1975 article.193 The draft
language proposed in the 1978 commission report' 94 became section
9(a) of the 1981 act: "the Court may admit to probate a testamentary
ple entitled to contest this application do not want to avail themselves of their rights,
then I will not strain to put the applicant to the rigors of the BRD standard." In Pos-
singham, 32 S.A. St. R. 227 (1983), an alteration case, Jacobs, J., concludes the para-
graph in which he explains why the evidence satisfies the BRD standard by referring to
the consent of the intestate heirs, the next takers, "against their own interest." Id. at
229.
190. Queensland Succession Act of 1981, § 9(a), 1981 Queensl. Stat. No. 69.
191. Queensland Law Reform Commission, Report of the Law Reform Commis-
sion on the Law Relating to Succession (1978) [hereinafter Queensland Report].
192. Queensland Succession Act of 1981, § 9(a), 1981 Queensl. Stat. No. 69.
193. Queensland Report, supra note 191, at 7.
194. The draft legislation appears as an appendix to the Queensland Report.
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instrument executed in substantial compliance with the [Wills Act] for-
malities ... if the Court is satisfied that the instrument expresses the
testamentary intention of the testator."'
95
As in South Australia, it took a while in Queensland for case law to
emerge from the probate pipeline. The Queensland measure came
into effect onJanuary 1, 1982. In 1983, after the South Australian cases
had begun to flow but before any Queensland decisions had appeared,
Lee expressed optimism in a scholarly journal that, "despite the differ-
ences of wording, the sorts of defects of execution which have been
[remedied under the South Australian statute] ... will be seen as com-
ing within the scope of the Queensland jurisdiction."
196
It was not to be. Four Queensland cases have been decided.
19 7
The first, Mcllroy,198 which applied the substantial compliance section
to excuse a presence defect, was decided in late 1984 without opinion
and was wholly overlooked in the three subsequent cases, all decided in
1985, that appear to have buried the reform. Those three, Grosert,t 99
Johnston,200 and Henderson,20 refused to apply the section to wills in-
stancing trivial execution errors in which testamentary intent was
manifest.
Mcflroy was decided by McPhersonJ., who had served as a member
of the Queensland Law Reform Commission when it recommended the
substantial compliance measure. The facts of the case disclosed a dif-
ference of recollection between the two attesting witnesses about
whether the testatrix signed the will in their joint presence.
"McPhersonJ held that it was unnecessary to resolve this dispute, since
even assuming that only one witness had been present at the time of
signature, the formal requirements of the Wills Act had been substan-
195. Queensland Succession Act of 1981, § 9(a).
196. Lee, Queensland Succession Act 1981, 3 OxfordJ. Leg. Stud. 442, 442 (1983).
197. I wish to acknowledge the help of Paul Burns of the Brisbane probate registry,
who supplied me with the documentation on these cases; and registrars RJ. Keane in
Townsville and G.D. Roberts in Rockhampton, who checked to establish that further
§ 9(a) cases had not been filed there.
In addition to the four decided cases identified, infra notes 198-201, at least one
other is pending. In Skinner, No. 190 of 1984 (Queensl. Sup. Ct.), an elderly testatrix
took her will to the reception desk of her nursing home and had the duty officer witness
her signature. She did not procure a second attesting witness. She told the one attest-
ing witness, "Thank you very much, that has got my will fixed up." Interview with O.G.
Eckhardt, solicitor for the proponent (Brisbane, Dec. 18, 1985). In South Australia, this
one-witness case would be regarded as a fortiori to the seven no-witness wills that have
been validated. See supra text accompanying notes 71-91. In Queensland, however,
Skinner seems doomed by the outcome in Henderson, No. 860 of 1985 (Queensl. Sup.
Ct. Sept. 27, 1985) (Macrossan, J.), discussed infra text accompanying notes 209-13.
198. No. 375 of 1984 (Queensl. Sup. Ct. Nov. 2, 1984) (McPherson, J.).
199. [1985] 1 Q.R. 513.
200. [1985] 1 Q.R. 516.
201. No. 860 of 1985 (Queensl. Sup. Ct. Sept. 27, 1985) (Macrossan,J.), affd full




tially complied with." 20 2
When Grosert arose, the unreported Mcllroy was unknown to Vasta,
J., who decided Grosert unaware that he was acting in irreconcilable con-
flict with precedent. Like Mcllroy, Grosert was a presence case, although
there was no dispute that the blunder had indeed occurred. 203 The
testator had his daughter-in-law attest his will when the two of them
were alone, hence not in the joint presence of the second witness. In
the key passage of the opinion, the judge announced that in these cir-
cumstances "there has been a lack of compliance with what I would
regard as a most important provision" 20 4 of the Wills Act. But why is
the presence requirement "most important"? The opinion supplies no
rationale. The conclusion rests upon assertion: Since presence is
"most important .... [i]t is difficult therefore to say that... there has
been substantial compliance with the formalities.
'20 5
The court in Grosert neglected to apply the purposive analysis that
the substantial compliance doctrine presupposes. The right question
under the doctrine is whether the testator's conduct served the pur-
poses of the Wills Act formality. The particular idea is that when the
purposes are served, noncompliance with the letter may be excused.206
The purposes of the presence requirement are to protect the testator
against imposition; and to enhance the solemnity of the execution cere-
mony, in order to assure that the instrument represents the considered
intent of the testator. The judge effectively conceded that those pur-
poses had been satisfied when he said that "there can be no doubt that
the instrument expresses the testamentary intention of the testator";
yet in the same sentence he concluded that "unless there is substantial
compliance," this finding of testamentary intent is "irrelevant.
' 20 7
What could "substantial compliance" mean if the testator's conduct can
evince unmistakable testamentary intent and still be insubstantial?
20 8
202. The Western Australia Law Reform Commission investigated the facts in
Mcllroy and gave this account in Western Australia Report, supra note 168, at 35. I have
confirmed with the judge that this account conforms to his recollection. Interview with
Hon. Bruce McPherson, (Brisbane, Dec. 17, 1985).
203. [1985] 1 Q.R. at 514-15.
204. Id. at 515.
205. Id.
206. Substantial compliance "enables courts to excuse formal defects when the
purposes of the legislation have been satisfied in particular situations notwithstanding
some deficiencies in complying literally with all the specified formalities." New South
Wales Report, supra note 133, § 6.13, at 69.
207. [1985] 1 Q.R. at 515.
208. InJohnston, [1985] 1 Q.R. 516, there was also a presence defect, but the cir-
cumstances were murkier. There was some evidence that a term may also have been
interpolated after the execution. Further, the testatrix had been furtive when obtaining
the attesting signatures; in one instance she had folded the paper over, and the witness
could not subsequently identify it. Although the judge endorsed the taking of"a liberal
approach," id. at 518, toward applying the substantial compliance doctrine, and con-
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In the quite recent Henderson209 case, the Queensland court re-
fused to cure an execution blunder in which the grounds for validation
were very strong. On its key facts, Henderson is a precise replay of the
South Australian Phillips210 case: Only a single witness attested the tes-
tator's will, but that witness was a JP who had misrepresented to the
testator that a single JP's attestation sufficed. In South Australia, the
testator who had relied upon official misinformation was excused from
his error. In Queensland he was not. Although the judge declared
himself "satisfied... that the instrument does express the testamentary
intention of the testator," the judge would not apply the substantial
compliance doctrine "since the will was executed with only one witness
present" and substantial compliance is "cumulative" 211 to the require-
ment of testamentary intent.
In the hands of the Queensland bench, substantial compliance is
no longer a means of discerning testamentary intent, it is a new formal
requirement that must be established independently of testamentary in-
tent. And the standard for this formality is essentially quantitative:
compliance cannot be substantial unless the defect is minimal. Said the
judge in Henderson:
there is an essential difficulty in saying that substantial compli-
ance with the requirements of the [Wills Act] has occurred if
the two witnesses ... have not been involved in some way or
other in the testator's execution or acknowledgment.
In the present case there are no such two witnesses in-
volved but one only, and in the case of such a basic deficiency I
am not prepared to regard substantial compliance as having
occurred .... 212
No matter that the court understands precisely why the testator was
misled into thinking himselfjustified in using only one witness, and no
matter that this explanation wholly excludes the dangers of imposition
and irresolution against which the attestation requirement is meant to
safeguard, since one is less than two, compliance cannot be substantial.
The first-instance judgment in Henderson was appealed to a three-
judge appellate panel of the Queensland court, which summarily dis-
missed the appeal and, in a rare departure from the contrary norm in
estate practice, charged the costs of the appeal to the petitioning execu-
ceded that "[ilt is probable that the eventual document... represents the final wishes of
the testatrix," id. at 519, he refused to find substantial compliance on these facts.
209. No. 860 of 1985 (Queensl. Sup. Ct. Sept. 27, 1985), affd full court (May 13,
1986), appeal denied [1986] 17 Leg. Rep. S.L. 4.
210. No. 263 of 1983 (S.A. Sup. Ct. Feb. 13, 1984) (WhiteJ.), discussed supra text
accompanying note 93. Henderson is also reminiscent of Crocker, 30 S.A. St. R. 321
(1982), discussed supra text accompanying note 72, in which the testator's reliance upon
official misinformation contained in a Royal Australian Air Force will form explained
and excused his failure to obtain attesting witnesses.
211. No. 860 of 1985, slip op. at 3.
212. Id. at 5.
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tor rather than the estate 2 ' 3 -a clear warning to future victims of defec-
tively executed wills not to try any further purposive applications of the
Queensland substantial compliance doctrine. The High Court of
Australia, the federal supreme court, put the final nails in the coffin
when it refused the plaintiff's application for leave to appeal, saying
that there was "no reason to doubt that the attestation by two witnesses
is a substantial requirement.., and that if the will is attested by one
witness only there has been a failure of substantial compliance. The
South Australian legislation is quite distinguishable."
214
It is now hard to imagine in what circumstances the Queensland
courts might find an execution defect insubstantial, since they have
(1) declared the most innocuous of the recurrent execution blunders,
presence defects, as "most important"; and (2) refused to rescue the
will of a testator whose failure to procure a second attesting witness was
induced through official misrepresentation.
Whether this unfortunate jurisprudence was a fluke that could have
been avoided in the hands of a more sensitive bench (as the decision of
McPherson, J. in Mcllroy strongly implies) is a subject that may beget
speculation, but future legislative drafters are scarcely likely to test the
waters again. The capsule lesson that will be taken from Queensland is
that statutory substantial compliance was tried and found wanting, de-
spite the evidence from South Australia that there was nothing to fear
from relaxing the traditional rule of strict compliance with the Wills
Act. Although the substantial compliance doctrine will continue to be
the only means of remedy available in jurisdictions where legislative
reform has not yet taken place, 215 future legislation will take the guise
of the dispensing power.
IV. THE SPREAD OF THE HARMLESS ERROR RULE
A. Australia
South Australia's dispensing-power statute is achieving pan-
Australian influence. The immense but barely populated Northern
Territory enacted a precise copy of South Australia's section 12(2) in
1984,216 following a 1979 recommendation of its law reform commit-
tee.2 17 In recent months the law reform commissions in New South
Wales (Sydney) and Western Austrlia (Perth) have published extensive
reports examining the harmless error problem and recommending ver-
213. No. 860 of 1985, slip op. at 3.
214. White v. Public Trustee & Blundell, [1986] 17 Leg. Rep. S.L. 4, denying ap-
peal sub nom. Henderson, No. 860 of 1985 (Queensl. Sup. Ct. Sept. 27, 1985), affd full
court, (May 13, 1986).
215. See supra text accompanying notes 18-19.
216. Northern Territory Wills Amendment Act of 1984, § 12(2).
217. Northern Territory Law Reform Committee, Relating to the Attestation of
Wills by Interested Witnesses and Due Execution of Wills 10-11 (1979).
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sions of the South Australian statute.218 In Victoria (Melbourne), the
other populous Australian state, a review committee appointed by the
attorney general has recommended the dispensing-power solution, and
the project has been referred to the law reform commission for a re-
port.2 1 9 Legislation is likely to result in some or all of these
jurisdictions.
In Tasmania, whose law reform commission reported in 1983,
before the disappointing Queensland case law appeared, the recom-
mendation was in favor of the substantial compliance solution.
220
The New South Wales and Western Australia commission reports
are carefully researched documents. Having learned from the South
Australian case law, both commissions urge that the dispensing power
should extend to errors in complying with the revocation formalities as
well as the execution formalities. 221 The New South Wales report is
particularly wide ranging and detailed. It criticizes the South
Australian BRD standard of proof and recommends a civil standard
"approximating that for rectification, ' 222 which should translate in
American parlance to the C&C standard. 223
The New South Wales report would extend the harmless error
doctrine to include not only execution errors but also mistakes in con-
tent (as when a lawyer or a typist misrenders or omits a term). 224 The
commission recommends extending to wills the existing judicial au-
thority to rectify mistaken instruments of inter vivos transfer such as
trusts.2 25 As has been mentioned above2 26 in connection with the
switched-wills cases that straddle the line between execution errors and
errors in contents, the development of a harmless error rule for execu-
tion errors and of a reformation or rectification rule for errors of con-
218. New South Wales Report, supra note 133; Western Australia Report, supra
note 168. A research report in aid of the New South Wales Report has been separately
published as an article. Lang, Formality v. Intention: Wills in an Australian Supermar-
ket, 15 Melbourne U.L. Rev. 82 (1985).
219. Wills Working Party, Initial Report (n.d., early 1986); letter from Dr. C.E.
Croft, Executive Director, Law Reform Commission of Victoria, to author (Feb. 26,
1986) (on file at the Columbia Law Review).
220. Law Reform Commission of Tasmania, Report on Reform in the Law of Wills
10 (1983).
221. New South Wales Report, supra note 133, § 6.31, at 73; Western Autralia Re-
port, supra note 168, § 8.11, at 53-55. These recommendations were foreshadowed in
British Columbia Report, supra note 133, at 69; and Manitoba Report, supra note 167,
at 29.
222. New South Wales Report, supra note 133, § 6.34, at 74.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 163-71.
224. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 111-12.
225. This is a reform for which Lawrence Waggoner and I have argued in the
American setting. See Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 107, at 524-28. The present
Article presents no occasion for reviewing the merits of that proposal, but I think it
important to notice that the parallels between the two problems have led the New South
Wales commission to want to deal simultaneously with both.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 111-12.
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tents would (if a common standard of proof such as the American C&C
evidence were employed) achieve doctrinal unification in the treatment
of both types of mistakes; and across both spheres of the law of gratui-
tous transfers, that is, both probate and nonprobate transfers.
B. Canada
The legislation in Australia in the 1970's prompted law reform
commissions in two Canadian jurisdictions to consider the harmless er-
ror problem.
In 1981 the British Columbia commission produced an extensively
researched report with a timid recommendation. 227 The report calls
for a dispensing power permitting the court to enforce a defectively
executed will if satisfied that the will reflects the testator's intention,
but only on condition that the will be in writing and that the testator
have signed it.228 Thus, the proposed reform would in practice be lim-
ited mainly to attestation defects. As of yet there has been no legisla-
tive response.
In 1983 Manitoba became the first (and thus far the only) North
American jurisdiction to enact a harmless error rule. The provincial
law reform commission published a report in 1980 preferring the South
Australian type of statute to the Queensland variety.229 The commis-
sion recommended that South Australia's BRD standard of proof be
deleted in favor of the ordinary civil standard, and that the legislation
"be very clearly worded to encompass revocation and alteration defects
as well as those of execution. ' 230 Section 23 of the Wills Act of 1983
enacted the measure as recommended.
231
In 1984 the Manitoba Queen's Bench decided Pouliot,2 32 the first
case under the measure. The testator had taken pen and ink to his val-
idly executed will, crossed out the institutional executor named there,
substituted two individuals, and signed his name immediately below
these modifications. The court ordered the will as amended admitted
to probate. "I am satisfied that the alterations to the will represent the
testamentary intentions of Mr. Pouliot," the judge said.
2 33
Manitoba is the first holograph jurisdiction in the common law
world to adopt a harmless error rule. The early indications234 are, as
227. British Columbia Report, supra note 133.
228. Id. at 54.
229. See Manitoba Report, supra note 167, at 26-27.
230. Id. at 29.
231. The Wills Act, 1982-83-84 Man. Rev. Stat. 387, ch. 31, § 23, Cap. W150
(1983).
232. 30 Man. R.2d 178 (Q.B. 1984), noted in Harvey, Casenote, 7 Est. & Tr. Q. 109
(1985).
233. 30 Man. R.2d at 180.
234. Cameron Harvey of the University of Manitoba Faculty of Law kindly investi-
gated and wrote me about the unreported practice. In Briggs, Q.B. No. 85.02.424 (Oct.
23, 1985) (Oliphant, J.), the holograph was not signed "at the end" as the Wills Act of
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one would expect, that some homedrawn wills that would require the
harmless error rule for rescue in a nonholograph jurisdiction will be




Discussion of the harmless error problem in the common law
world proceeded until 1979 in ignorance of the fact that Israel had en-
acted in 1965 a statute that has the main attributes of the South Austra-
lian dispensing power. Section 25 of the Israeli Succession Law of
1965 provides: "Where the Court has no doubt as to the genuineness
of a will, it may grant probate thereof notwithstanding any defect with
regard to the signature of the testator or of the witnesses, the date of
the will, . . . or the capacity of the witnesses."
'2 36
1983 requires. But because the will had been executed before 1983, when, pursuant to
the decision in Tachibana, 63 W.W.R. 99 (Man. Ct. App. 1968), that requirement did
not govern holographs, the court held that the will complied with the formalities and
there was no need to use § 23. By contrast, in Public Trustee v. Hedstrom, Q.B. No.
15378 (1985) (St. Bon, J.), Ct. App. No. 95/85, § 23 was used to validate a holograph
suffering from the same defect. Since the will in question also predated the 1983 change
in the holograph statute, Harvey observes that "it was not necessary for the courts to
have referred to s[ection] 23; this case could have been decided in the same way Briggs
•.. [was] decided." Letter from C. Harvey to author, June 11, 1986, at 1 (on file at the
Columbia Law Review). Section 23 was also pleaded in a third case, Cumming, Probate
85-01-02817 (1985), in which the requirements of holograph formality were arguably
met. The case was settled. Id. Harvey notes that Manitoba has also seen some attempts
to use the harmless error statute to simplify the proofs in lost will cases. Id. at 2. Where
an original will has been validly executed but has gone astray, conventional law allows
the fact of execution and the contents to be proved from copies and extrinsic evidence
according to a high standard of proof, see supra text accompanying note 163. Accord-
ingly, there should be no occasion to use the dispensing power in such cases.
235. I have long been puzzled that the rule of strict compliance with Wills Act for-
mality has not come under more pressure in leading American holograph jurisdictions,
especially California, on account of the tension between the two levels of formality.
The legislatures in these states have authorized in the holograph a type of testa-
tion that completely dispenses with the protective policy that is the dominant
concern of so many of the formalities for attested wills. When, therefore, a
testator attempts to make an attested will but blunders, he will still have
achieved a level of formality that compares favorably with that permitted for a
holographic will in the same state.
Langbein, supra note 1, at 1195.
236. Succession Law, 5725-1965, in Ministry of Justice, 19 Laws of the State of
Israel 62, ch. 1, § 25 (1965) (authorized translation).
After the British Columbia Law Reform Commission discovered the Israeli statute
and brought it to my attention, I engaged a Hebrew-speaking research assistant, David
Landes, to work with the cases, and I reported on them in a paper prepared for the 1980
meeting of the American Bar Association that was held in Sydney. Langbein, Defects of
Form in the Execution of Wills: Australian and Other Experience with the Substantial




The main Israeli unsigned will case, Gitah,237 dates from 1971. It
was subsequently endorsed in two of the South Australian precedents
discussed above, Baumanis238 and Williams. 239 The court in Gitah re-
fused to apply the harmless error rule to an unsigned and undated writ-
ing found among the decedent's papers after his death. The
instrument said: "In the case of death my brother inherits from me-I
want to be buried in Moshav Yanov or in Jerusalem." 240 The obvious
rationale for refusing to validate such an instrument (as in Baumanis) is
that the proponents have not carried their burden of proving that the
paper was a will as opposed to a mere draft. But the Israeli court spoke
as though total noncompliance with the requirements of dating and sig-
nature could never be remedied under the dispensing power, on the
conceptualistic ground that, whereas section 25 authorizes remedy for a
"defect," an omission is somehow more fundamental than a mere
defect.
In 1981 the Israeli Supreme Court endorsed this logic in a shock-
ing case that ultimately provoked the legislature to amend the stat-
ute.241 The decedent in Koenig v. Cohen 242 was a young woman who
lived estranged from her husband. She became distressed when, under
the restrictive Israeli divorce law, she found herself unable to terminate
her marriage. Accompanied by her three-year-old daughter she
checked into a room on the twentieth floor of the Tel Aviv Sheraton.
An hour later the two plunged to their deaths in what was determined
to have been a suicide and infanticide. In the hotel room the decedent
left several handwritten slips of paper. None were dated or signed as
required under local law for a holographic will.243 In one of these
notes she gave an account of her motivations; another asked certain
relatives to keep the husband away from her funeral; and in yet an-
other, which she labelled "Will," she asked that her estate be divided
among her four brothers. When one of her brothers sought to enforce
the instrument under the dispensing power, the husband resisted. The
first-instance court refused probate, and the Supreme Court affirmed in
two judgments (the second a rehearing). The Supreme Court followed
Gitah, concluding that omitted formalities are more serious than mere
defects and hence fall outside the scope of the statutory dispensing
power.
Koenig v. Cohen is wrong. The only plausible object that the legisla-
ture could have had in authorizing the courts under section 25 to rem-
237. Estate 39/70, 76 P.M. 156 (Dist. Ct. 1971).
238. 25 S.A. St. R. 423, 426 (1980).
239. 36 S.A. St. R. 423, 429 (1984).
240. Estate 39/70, 76 P.M. 156 (Dist. Ct. 1971).
24 1. I am grateful to Judge I.S. Shiloh of Tel Aviv, who has kept me abreast of the
developments recounted in the next paragraphs; and to Irwin Keller, who translated the
sources.
242. C.A. 86/79, 35 P.D. 176 (1981); F.H. 40/80, 36 P.D. 708 (1982).
243. Succession Law, § 19.
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edy a "defect" in the signature of a will is to dispense with the signature
in exceptional cases of well proven intent. No dispensing power is
needed for other types of "defect" in complying with the signature re-
quirement-for example, signing by mark or by nickname. Such
problems are commonly dealt with as matters of construction under
existing law. 244 The court's strict reading of the word "defect" made
the statute superfluous. On its facts, Koenig v. Cohen is easily distin-
guishable from Gitah. Koenig v. Cohen resembles the South Australian
case, Franks, in which the court validated an unattested instrument that
the decedent left at the scene of his suicide.2 4-5 Franks is an easier case
than Koenig v. Cohen because only attestation was missing, not signature.
Nevertheless, what distinguishes both cases from the "mere draft"
cases like Baumanis and Gitah is the evidence of finality of intent that
arises from the conduct of a testator who creates an ostensibly testa-
mentary instrument in circumstances of certain death. We understand
why somebody busy committing suicide may not have Wills Act formali-
ties on his mind.
Reacting to the ugly result in Koenig v. Cohen, the Israeli legislature
amended section 25 in 1985 to sweep away the conceptual ground on
which the case rested. A new subsection dealing with holographs was
addded to section 25. It provides that when "the court has no doubt as
to the authenticity of the holograph and the finality of purpose of the
testator," the court is empowered to validate the will "despite the omis-
sion of a signature or date as required" in the holograph statute. 246
Although this liberalizing amendment was found necessary to ex-
tend the dispensing power to an unsigned holograph, the Israeli harm-
less error rule has otherwise been regarded as a success. In 1979,
Judge I.S. Shiloh, an authority on Israeli probate law, advised the
British Columbia Law Reform Commission about Israel's then four-
teen-year experience with its dispensing power statute. He made a tell-
ing observation about litigation levels under the measure:
[I]t has been my experience that Advocates are gradually at-
taching less and less importance to defects of form in a will
since they are aware of the Court's approach, and will not op-
pose probate merely on grounds of such defects. I am, there-
fore, of the opinion that s[ection] 25 actually prevents a great
deal of unnecessary litigation and saves time and expense in
cases before the Court. Its effect is to limit the battleground
to issues which should be the foremost if not the only ones,
i.e., to the question: Is the will a true expression of the testa-
tor's intent?2 47
244. See, e.g., for the American black letter, T. Atkinson, supra note 122, at
297-99.
245. No. 10 of 1983 (S.A. Sup. Ct. Aug. 9, 1983) (Cox, J.), discussed supra text
accompanying notes 73-74.
246. Succession Law (Amendment No. 7) 1985, [1985] Knesset Laws 80.
247. Letter fromJudge I.S. Shiloh, Tel Aviv, to Law Reform Commission of British
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A properly conceived harmless error rule actually decreases litigation
about Wills Act formalities, although hard cases that require judicial
resolution must inevitably arise. A harmless error rule suppresses liti-
gation about technicalities of compliance, since the court will excuse
errors anyhow; and the rule subjects whatever litigation still arises to a
purposive standard more predictable than the intrinsically arbitrary for-
malism of the rule of strict compliance.
248
D. England
Every law reform authority that has studied the strict compliance
problem has recommended some sort of harmless error rule, except in
England. In a brief section of a 1980 report devoted mainly to changes
in certain of the Wills Act formalities, the Law Reform Committee dis-
approved the South Australian example. The report said "that by mak-
ing it less certain whether or not an informally executed will is capable
of being admitted to probate, [a dispensing power] could lead to litiga-
tion, expense and delay, often in cases where it could least be afforded,
for it is the home-made wills which most often go wrong. '249 This is,
of course, the familiar concern that a harmless error rule would beckon
schemers to throw estates into litigation. The South Australian cases
(all but one decided after the English report) have now put that argu-
ment to the test and refuted it.
V. CONCLUSION
The abiding lesson that emerges from the decade's experience
with the harmless error rule in South Australia is that the rule works.
Among the aspects of the story that deserve emphasis are these:
(1) Excusing execution blunders does not undermine the Wills
Act. Properly understood,250 the litigation levels have been astonish-
ingly low. The reform has not engendered trumped-up claims. Nor
Columbia (Oct. 18, 1979), quoted with permission of the author, reprinted in part in
British Columbia Report, supra note 133, at 46.
248. See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 6, at 525-26.
249. Law Reform Committee, The Making and Revocation of Wills, 1980, 22d Re-
port, Comnd. No. 7904, at 4.
In a forthcoming article scheduled to appear in the International and Comparative
Law Quarterly, J. Gareth Miller, a leading writer on English succession law, concludes a
discussion of the Australian case law with the observation that the English will have to
rethink the matter. Miller, Substantial Compliance and the Execution of Wills 29 (man-
uscript on file with Columbia Law Review).
The Scottish Law Commission is expected to make a recommendation on the sub-
ject in 1987. In September 1986 it issued a preliminary report soliciting views "on the
questions whether a dispensing power should be introduced and, if so, what form it
should take." Scottish Law Commission, The Making and Revocation of Wills 20 (Con-
sultative Memorandum No. 70) (1986).
250. By which I mean, adjusted for the litigation-breeding no-waiver rule of the
local probate practice that I have criticized, supra text accompanying notes 174-89.
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has it inspired testators to become sloppy about executing their wills-
people do not set out to embroil their estates in litigation. Thus, the
reform has left unaffected the estates of testators who have complied
fully with the Wills Act formalities. Nevertheless, the South Australian
case law shows us that the estates of those who have committed innocu-
ous execution errors are now being distributed in accordance with their
wishes. The intent-serving goal of the Wills Act is achieved better with-
out than with the rule of strict compliance.
(2) From the first decision to the most recent, the South
Australian courts have given the dispensing power a purposive inter-
pretation. The larger the departure from the purposes of Wills Act for-
mality, the harder it is to excuse a defective instrument. Breach of the
peripheral presence rule, indeed of any attestation requirement, has
been relatively lightly excused. By contrast, the courts have excused
the testator's failure to sign his will only in extraordinary
circumstances.
(3) Implicitly, this case law has produced a ranking of the Wills
Act formalities. Of the three main formalities-writing, signature, and
attestation-writing turns out to be indispensable. Because section
12(2) requires a "document," nobody has tried to use the dispensing
power to enforce an oral will. Failure to give permanence to the terms
of your will is not harmless. Signature ranks next in importance. If you
leave your will unsigned, you raise a grievous doubt about the finality
and genuineness of the instrument. An unsigned will is presumptively
only a draft, as the landmark decision in Baumanis v. Praulin2 51 insisted,
but that presumption is rightly overcome in compelling circumstances
such as in the switched-wills cases. 252 By contrast, attestation makes a
more modest contribution, primarily of a protective character, to the
Wills Act policies. But the truth is that most people do not need pro-
tecting,253 and there is usually strong evidence that want of attestation
did not result in imposition. The South Australian courts have been
quick to find such evidence and to excuse attestation defects under the
dispensing power.
(4) In devaluing attestation while insisting on signature and writ-
ing, the South Australian legislation and case law has brought the
South Australian law of wills into a kind of alignment with the American
law of will substitutes, that is, with our nonprobate system, where busi-
ness practice has settled the forms for transfer.254 In life insurance
beneficiary designations; in bank transfer arrangements such as pay-on-
death accounts, joint accounts, and Totten trusts; in pension accounts;
251. 25 S.A. St. R. 423 (1980), discussed supra text accompanying notes 97-99.
252. See supra text accompanying notes 101-10.
253. This is a theme of the celebrated article, Gulliver & Tilson, Classification of
Gratuitous Transfers, 51 Yale L.J. 1, 9-13 (1941).
254. See supra text accompanying note 11; see also Langbein, The Nonprobate
Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succession, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1108 (1984).
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and in revocable inter vivos trusts, writing is the indispensable formal-
ity of modern practice, and signature is nearly as universal. Attestation,
however, is increasingly uncommon.
(5) Although in theory there should have been little reason to
choose between the purposive South Australian dispensing power and
the purposive substantial compliance doctrine,255 the practice in
Queensland proved otherwise. The courts read into their substantial
compliance doctrine a near-miss standard, ignoring the central issue of
whether the testator's conduct evidenced testamentary intent. I am not
alone in thinking that the work of the Queensland courts in sabotaging
their substantial compliance statute was a self-inflicted wound.256 Nev-
ertheless, the contest between statutory substantial compliance and
statutory dispensing power is resolved. Future legislation will take the
form of the dispensing power. The substantial compliance doctrine
will, however, remain available to do the work for which it was devised;
it is the one means by which a court may relieve an execution error
when legislation has not yet intervened to supply a statutory harmless
error rule.
(6) Future legislation patterned on South Australia's dispensing
power should contain two refinements that have been suggested by the
decade's experience. The legislation should explicitly reach errors in
compliance with revocation formality, although the South Australian
experience shows that the courts must of necessity extend the reform to
revocation formality. And the standard of proof should be pitched be-
low that of the criminal law but above that of ordinary civil litigation-
in American parlance, clear and convincing evidence.
(7) The development of a statutory remedy to cure mistakes in
complying with execution formalities invites consideration of the paral-
lel (and in one area overlapping 257) problem of mistakes in content.
When a typist drops a paragraph, or a lawyer misdescribes a devisee,
the law should be prepared to correct the error if the error can be
proved according to the same clear and convincing standard of proof
that applies when such mistakes arise in the law of will substitutes. In
the law of wills, both the traditional refusal to excuse innocuous execu-
tion errors and the traditional refusal to correct obvious mistakes in
content, result from the same theoretical excess- overvaluing the re-
quirements of Wills Act formality. 258 That is why our law contains a
long-standing reformation doctrine for will substitutes like trusts and
life insurance contracts, but none for wills. The success of the harmless
255. See supra text accompanying note 206. This point is developed in Harvey,
supra note 232, at I10.
256. New South Wales Report, supra note 133, §§ 6.15-16, at 69-71.
257. In the switched-wills cases, see discussion of the overlap, supra text accompa-
nying notes I 11-12.
258. For discussion of the Wills Act as the source of the no-reformation rule for
mistakes of content, see Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 107, at 524-54.
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error rule for execution errors casts a shadow over the traditional no-
reformation rule for mistakes in content. The New South Wales Law
Reform Commission has grasped this point and recommended that leg-
islation in that state embrace both a dispensing power for execution
errors and a reformation power for mistaken content.259 Both would
operate under a standard of proof that, in American terms, would be
described as clear and convicing evidence. Accordingly, the opportu-
nity has now arisen for legislation to create a unitary mistake doctrine
for curing errors both of form and of content in the execution and rev-
ocation of wills. If that opportunity is pursued, we may witness the
elimination of some of the harshest and most senseless rules that re-
main in Anglo-American private law.
(8) Americans should be grateful indeed to the Australians (and
Canadians and Israelis) who turned their legal systems into laboratories
for testing and perfecting the harmless error rule. We should under-
stand the force of these comparative examples, we should shudder that
we still inflict upon our citizens the injustice of the traditional law, and
we should join in this movement to rid private law of relics so
embarrassing.
259. Discussed supra text accompanying note 224.
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